Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1992

West Valley City v. Dennis L. Streeter : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
John Richard Catten; West Valley City Prosecutor; Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent.
Jerrald D. Conder; Conder and Wangsgard; Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, West Valley City v. Streeter, No. 920349 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/3296

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

BHJEF
ITA
K>. •-. ..

o
MO

£°CKET NO.

J^^J
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

ijJ&^

ClM f
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Plaintiff/M^HHfc,
vs.

Case No. 920349-CA

DENNIS L. STREETER,

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR SALT
LAKE COUNTY, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH,
THE HONORABLE WILLIAM A. THORNE, JR., PRESIDING

Jerrald D. Conder
CONDER & WANGSGARD
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
4059 South 4000 West
West Valley City, Utah 84120

John Richard Catten
West Valley City Prosecutor
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent
3600 South 2700 West
West Valley City, Utah 84119

I

SEP 111992

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

PlaintiffMiMnt,
vs.

Case No. 920349-CA

DENNIS L. STREETER,

Priority No. 2

De fendant/Appe1lant.
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR SALT
LAKE COUNTY, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH,
THE HONORABLE WILLIAM A. THORNE, JR., PRESIDING

Jerrald D. Conder
CONDER & WANGSGARD
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
4059 South 4000 West
West Valley City, Utah 84120

John Richard Catten
West Valley City Prosecutor
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent
3600 South 2700 West
West Valley City, Utah 84119

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

1

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED

1

RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES
AND ORDINANCES

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

5

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

9

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

9

ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO
DISMISS AND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AS REVISED
WEST VALLEY CITY ORDINANCE 23-5-104 VIOLATES THE
UNITED STATES AND UTAH CONSTITUTIONS

11

A. REVISED WEST VALLEY CITY ORDINANCE 23-5-104(8)
IS IN CONFLICT WITH GENERAL LAW AND IS THEREFORE
CONSTITUTIONALLY INVALID PURSUANT TO ARTICLE XI,
SECTION 5 OF THE UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION . . . .

12

B. WEST VALLEY CITY ORDINANCE §23-5-104(8)(a)
IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL, BEING VOID FOR BOTH
VAGUENESS AND OVERBREADTH

18

C. RWVCO UNCONSTITUTIONALLY INTERFERES WITH
INTERSTATE COMMERCE AND TRAVEL AND IS FEDERALLY
PREEMPTED BY 7 U.S.C. §2156(d)

28

D. WEST VALLEY CITY ORDINANCE §23-5-104(8) (a)
IS VIOLATIVE OF SECTION 1 ARTICLE I OF THE
UTAH CONSTITUTION AND THEREFORE VOID

34

CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT

37

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES;

Page

American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347,
(1909)

17,27

American Fork City v. Robinson, 292 P.249 (1930)

17

Backman v. Bateman, 263 P.2d 561 (S.Ct. Utah 1953)

36

California Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 107 S.Ct.
683 (1987)
City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624,

32

(1972)

33

City of Wichita v. Wallace, 788 P.2d 270 (Kan. 1990)

21,22

Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979)

19,25
26

Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926)

19

Dae Woo Kim v. City of New York, 774 F.Supp. 164 (S.D.N.Y.
1991)

20,24

Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963)

. 32

Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1951)

33

Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (1824)

31

Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972)

20,21
24

Greaves v. State, 528 P.2d 805 (Utah 1974)

21

Greenwood v. City of North Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 816
(Utah 1991)
Gronlund v. Salt Lake -City, 194 P.2d 464 (1948)
Hastings v. Judicial Conference of U.S., 485 U.S. 1014,

25
13

829 F.2d 91 (D.C.Cir. 1987)

24

Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941)

31

Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983)

20,25
26,27

ii

Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939)

19

Logan City v. Huber, 786 P.2d 1372 (1990)

24,27

Morisette v. United States, 324 U.S. 246 (1952)

22

NAACP v. Burton, 371 U.S. 415 (1963)

20

Nance v. Mayflower, Tavern, Inc., 150 P.2d 773 (1944)

....

13

Parker v. Provo City Corp., 543 P.2d 769 (1975)

14

Peck v. Dunn, 574 P.2d 367 (1978)

15

Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1955)

33

Perez v. Campbell, 401 U.S. 637 (1970)

31

Pride Oil Co. v. Salt Lake County, 370 P.2d 355 (S.Ct. Utah
1962)

35,36

Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1946)

32,33

Rimensburger v. Rimensberger, 190 U.A.R. 48 (Ut.App.Ct.
1992)
Ritholz v. City of Salt Lake, 284 P.2d 702 (1955)

2
13,17
35

Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984)

....

19

Salt Lake City v. Revenue, 124 P.2d 537 (1942)

17

Salt Lake City v. Sutter, 216 P.234 (1923)

13,18

Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)

28

State v. Blowers, 717 P.2d 1321 (1986)

20,21

State v. Hutchison, 624 P.2d 1116 (Utah 1980)

14

State v. Salt Lake City, 445 P.2d 691 (1968)

13

State v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213 (Ut.App.Ct. 1991)

2

Stevenson v. Salt Lake City, 317 P.2d 597 (1957)

17

Waters v. McGuriman, 656 F.Supp. 923 (E.D.Pa. 1987)

24

iii

STATUTES:
23-5-104(8), Revised West Valley City Ordinances,
Cruelty to Animals Prohibited - Animals for
Fighting
23-1-102(2) Revised West Valley City Ordinances,
Powers of Animal Control Officials
10-8-84, Utah Code Annotated (1992 as amended)
78-2(a)-3(d), Utah Code Annotated (1992 as amended)
Title 7, United States Code Annotated, Section 2156
Animal Welfare Act Amendment of 1976

passim
3,26
13
1
passim

OTHER AUTHORITIES:
Utah State Constitution, Article I, Section 1
Utah State Constitution, Article I, Section 7

passim
2,5,10
18
2,5,9
12
4
19
passim

Utah State Constitution, Article XI, Section 5
United States Constitution, Article I, Section 14
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution . . . .
1 C Antieua, Municipal Corporation Law, Section 5.01 (1967)
1 E McQuillin, Municipal Corporation Law, Section 1.93
(3d Ed. 1949)

.

13
13

McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, Section 24.09
(3d Edition)

14

Pub.L. 94-279, 1976 U.S. Code Cong, and Adm. News, p.797 . . .
J.W. Cooper, M.D., Game Fowls, Their Origin and History,
p. 35 (standard edition) (1869) . . . .
LaFave and Scott, Substantive Criminal Law, Section 2.3,
at 128-32 (1986)

iv

33

16
20

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 920349-CA

DENNIS L. STREETERf
Defendant/Appellant.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This appeal is from a judgment and conviction for Cruelty to
Animals, in violation of West Valley City Ordinance 23-5-104(8),
a Class B Misdemeanor.

This Court obtains jurisdiction pursuant

to §78-2a-3(d) Utah Code Annotated (1992 as amended).
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal of right from final judgment of conviction
for the offense of cruelty to animals entered

in the Third

Judicial Circuit Court in and for Salt Lake County, West Valley
City Department, the Honorable William A. Thorne, Jr., presiding.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
Standard of Review;
The issues presented for review pertain to whether the court
erred in denying defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Motion for
Reconsideration

because

RWVCO

23-5-104(8)

is unconstitutional

under numerous provisions of the Utah State and United States
Constitutions.

The standard of review for each of the issues on
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review is the clear error standard as to the findings of fact of
the court and the correction of error standard as to the court's
legal

conclusions.

(Ut.App.Ct. 1991).
accorded

no

State

v.

Steward,

806

P. 2d

213,

215

The trial court's conclusions of law are

deference

and

are

reviewed

for

correctness.

Rimensburger v. Rimensburger, 190 U.A.R. 48 (Ut.App.Ct. 1992).
Issues on Review:
1.

Is Revised West Valley City Ordinance 23-5-104 (8) (a)

unconstitutional pursuant to Article XIf Section 5 of the Utah
State Constitution?
2.

Is Revised West Valley City Ordinance 23-5-104(8)(a)

unconstitutional

pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment of the

United States Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the Utah
Constitution, as being vague and overbroad?
3.

Is Revised West Valley City Ordinance 23-5-104(8)(a)

preempted by Title 7, Section 2156(d) of the United States Code,
and an unconstitutional interference with interstate commerce and
of the right to travel?
4.

Is Revised West Valley City Ordinance 23-5-104(8)(a)

violative of Section lf Article I of the Utah Constitution and
therefore void?
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND ORDINANCES
Revised West Valley City Ordinance 23-5-104(8) (1985):
CRUELTY ANIMALS PROHIBITED.
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(8) Animals for fighting:
(a)
It shall be unlawful for any person or
corporation to raise, keep or use any animal, fowl or
bird for the purposes of fighting or baiting; and for
any person to be a party to or be present as a
spectator at any such fighting or baiting of any animal
or fowl; and for any person, firm or corporation to
knowingly rent any building, shed, room, yard, ground
or premises for any such purposes as aforesaid, or to
knowingly suffer or permit the use of his buildings,
sheds, rooms, yards, grounds or premises for the
purposes aforesaid.
(b) Law Enforcement Officers or Office of Animal
Control officials may enter any building or place where
there is an exhibition of the fighting or baiting of a
live animal, or where preparations are being made for
such an exhibition, and the Law Enforcement Officers
may arrest persons there present and take possession of
all animals engaged in fighting, or there found for the
purposes of fighting, along with all implements or
applications used in such exhibition. This provision
shall not be interpreted to authorize a search or
arrest without a warrant when such is required.
Revised West Valley City Ordinance 23-2-102 (1985):
POWERS OF ANIMAL CONTROL OFFICIALS.
(2) The Animal Control Director, his deputies,
assistants and Animal Control Officers are hereby
authorized and empowered to apprehend and take with
them and impound any animal found in violation of this
ordinance including, but not limited to unlicensed
dogs.
Utah Code Annotated §10-8-84:
Ordinances, Rules and Regulations - Passage-Penalties
They may pass all ordinances and rules, and make all
regulations, not repugnant to law, necessary for
carrying into effect or discharging all powers and
duties conferred by this chapter, and as are necessary
and proper to provide for the safety and preserve the
health, and promote the prosperity, improve the morals,
peace and good order, comfort, and convenience of the
city and its inhabitants, and for the protection of
property in the city; and may enforce obedience to the
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ordinance with fines or penalities as they may deem
properf but the punishment of any offense shall be by
fine not to exceed the maximum Class B Misdemeanor fine
under Section 76-3-3-1 or by imprisonment not to exceed
six months, or by both the fine and imprisonment.
Title 7 U.S.C. Section 2156, (1990):
ANIMAL FIGHTING VENTURE PROHIBITION
(a) Sponsoring or exhibiting animal in any fighting
venture
It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly
sponsor or exhibit an animal in any animal fighting
venture to which any animal was moved in interstate or
foreign commerce.
(b)
Buying,
selling,
delivering,
or
transporting
animals
for participation
in
animal
fighting venture
It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly
sell, buy, transport, or deliver to another person or
receive
from
another
person
for
purposes
of
transportation, in interstate or foreign commerce, any
dog or other animal for purposes of having the dog or
other animal participate in an animal fighting venture.
(c)
Use of Postal Service or other interstate
instrumentality for promoting or furthering animal
fighting venture
It shcill be unlawful for any person to knowingly
use the mail service of the United States Postal
Service or any interstate instrumentality for purposes
of promoting or in any other manner furthering an
animal fighting venture except as performed outside the
limits of the States of the United States,
(d) Violation of State law
Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (a),
(b), or (c) of the section the activities prohibited by
such subsections shall be unlawful with the respect to
fighting ventures involving live birds only if the
fight is to take place in a State where it would be in
violation of laws thereof.
United States Constitution, Article I, Section 14:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens
of the United States and of the State wherein they
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reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Utah State Constitution, Article I, Section 1;
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to
enjoy and defend their lives and liberties, to acquire,
possess and protect property; to worship according to
the dictates of their consciences; to assemble
peaceably, protest against wrongs, and petition for
redress of grievances; to communicate freely their
thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse
of that right.
Utah State Constitution, Article I, Section 7;
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law.
Utah State Constitution, Article XI, Section 5:
Addendum for text)

(Please see

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This matter arose as the result of a DUI stop on May 27,
1990

(R-l. 37).

Defendant was detained by West Valley City

police authorities as he was returning from Arizona

(R-l. 37)

where defendant had engaged birds in fighting ventures where the
sport of cockfighting is legal (R-l. 37). On May 30th, Dennis
Streeter was charged with six counts of cruelty to animals, in
violation of West Valley City Revised Ordinance 23-5-104, under
Case No. 901001586 (R-l. 37).

The defendant was charged with

Case No. 901001586MC and Case No. 901001677 were
consolidated by the Court of Appeals under Case No. 92-0349CA.
Because the trial court's record is numbered individually under
-5-

raising, keeping or using poultry
(Id,)

for the purpose of

fighting.

The defendant was returning from having fought the birds

in Arizona, where such fighting is legal.
Subsequently,

on May

(Id.)

31, 1992, the

defendant

was

charged

with one additional charge of cruelty to animals under a second
information in Case No. 901001677MC
defendant was charged with the

(R-2. 1 ) .

In addition, the

following violations

under

that

same information:
(1)

Doing business without a license in violation of West

Valley City Ordinance 17-1-102; (Id.)
(2)
business

Improper
in

Uses

violation

for R-l-8 zone
of

Revised

West

for operating
Valley

City

a poultry
Ordinance

7-9-103; (Id.)
(3)
non-zoned

Improper
area

uses

for R-l-8 zone

in violation

of

Revised

for keeping
West

poultry

Valley

in

Ordinance

7-9-102; (Id.)
(4)

Too

many

dogs

in

violation

of

West

Valley

City

in

violation

of

West

Valley

City

Ordinance 23-1-101; (Id.)
(5)

Too

many

dogs

Ordinance 23-1-101; (Id.)

each case number, all references to the record shall be as
follows:
R-l shall pertain to the record in Case N o . 901001586
and all references to R-2 shall pertain to Case N o . 901001677.
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(6)

Failure to Obtain Rabies Vaccination in violation of

West Valley City Ordinance 23-4-102; (Id,)
(7)

Accumulations of Solid Waste and Littering in Violation

of West Valley City Ordinance 24-1-11; (Id.)
(8)

Improper Height for Fences in violation of West Valley

City Ordinance 7-2-119 (R-2.). (Id.)
The
animals

defendant
charges

filed

brought

a Motion
under

both

to

Dismiss

Case

Nos.

the

cruelty

9010011677

to
and

901001586

(R-2. 55-61), which motion was denied by memorandum

decision,

dated

defendant

filed a Motion

January

27,

1992

(R-l.

to Reconsider

37).

Subsequently,

the court's

denial

of

defendant's Motion to Dismiss and presented additional grounds
for

challenging

the

constitutionality

of

West

Valley

City

Ordinance 23-5-104, the violation of which was the basis of the
cruelty to animals charges filed against the defendant (R-l. 47).
Argument pertaining to defendant's Motion for Reconsideration was
presented to the court on March 30, 1992 (Tr. 1-17).

Said motion

together with counsel's request for time to brief the issues set
forth therein was denied by the court on the record of the trial
proceeding conducted March 30, 1992 (Tr. 13) .
On March 30, 1992, the defendant waived his right to a trial
on the merits and entered a conditional guilty plea to count one
of the information filed in connection with Case No. 901001586,
to wit, cruelty

to animals, a violation
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of West Valley

City

Ordinance 23-5-104

(Tr. 10, 13, 19, 20).

The remaining five

charges of cruelty to animals set forth in the information were
dismissed

(R-l.

66,

67) .

The

defendant

also

entered

a

conditional guilty plea to count four of the information filed in
connection with Case No. 901001677, to wit, cruelty to animals, a
violation of West Valley City Ordinance 23-5-104 (Tr. 11, 13, 19,
20) .

Defendant pled guilty to counts one, two and eight of the

information, to wit, doing business without a license, improper
use

of

R-1-8

improperly

zone

zoned

for

operating

area, and

littering, respectively

a poultry

accumulation

(R-2. 74, 75).

of

business
solid

in an

waste

and

All remaining charges

filed in connection with Case No. 901001677 were dismissed (Tr.
11; R-2. 74, 75) .
The defendant's reservation of right with regard to the
conditional guilty pleas entered in both of the above-referenced
cases, was put on the record at the sentencing proceeding and was
incorporated into defendant's guilty plea affidavits

(Tr. 10-15,

19, 20; R-l. 17-22, 49-54).

On April 30, 1992, at the hour of

10:00

William

o'clock

a.m.,

defendant to sixty
$1,000.00

(Tr.

73;

Judge

A.

Thorne

sentenced

the

(60) days in jail and imposed a fine of
R-2.

75).

Said

sentence

was

suspended

pursuant to defendant meeting certain terms and conditions of
said sentence, including the absence of further violations within
a one year period, compliance with the terms of probation, and
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compliance

wit

zoning

ordinances

(Tr.

73;

R-2.

75).

The

defendant filed a Notice of Appeal May 29, 1992, in both Case No,
901001586 and Case No. 901001677 (R-l. 68f R-2. 76). The cases
were consolidated by the Utah Court of Appeals under Case No.
920349-CA on June 23, 1992.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The appellant is a resident of West Valley City, residing at
3351 South 7200 West (R-2. 1). Appellant has operated a poultry
business at said residence, raising game fowl which he utilizes
for fighting outside of West Valley City and the State of Utah,
including Arizona, where cockfighting is legal (R-l. 37; Tr. 21,
In.13; Tr. 20, In.17).

Appellant was charged with cruelty to

animals, inter alia, when he was stopped by West Valley Police
officers on May 29, 1992 in connection with a DUI stop (R-l. 37).
Defendant was en route to West Valley City from Arizona, where he
had engaged fowl in the activity of cockfighting. (Id.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Revised

West

Valley

City

Ordinance

23-5-104(8) (a)

is

unconstitutional pursuant to Article XI, Section 5 of the Utah
Constitution as it exceeds the regulatory and lawmaking authority
endowed West Valley City by the State of Utah and is in conflict
with general law.

The police powers conferred upon West Valley

City by the general welfare clause empower West Valley City to
enact only those laws which are reasonably and substantially

-9-

related to improving the health, safety and morals of the West
Valley

City

citizenry.

The

ordinance

at

issue

is

not

substantially or reasonably related to the protection of the
general welfare of West Valley City inhabitants.

Accordingly,

Revised West Valley City Ordinance 23-5-104(8)(a) is an improper
and unconstitutional exercise of the police powers statutorily
conferred upon West Valley City and cannot be upheld.
Revised West Valley City Ordinance violates both the Utah
and United States Constitutions as it is unconstitutionally vague
and overbroad.

The ordinance is void for vagueness as it fails

to clearly define or set forth explicit standards such that a
person of ordinary intelligence may have an opportunity to know
what is prohibited by the ordinance.
for

overbreadth

as

it

sweeps

The ordinance is also void

within

its

ambit

legitimate

activities occurring outside the boundaries of West Valley City
or

the

State

of

Utah,

and

constitutes

an

extraterritorial

criminal statute in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution as well as Article I, Section 7, and
Article I, Section 1 of the Utah State Constitution.
The Ordinance violates the right to travel implicit in the
United States and Utah Constitutions and unlawfully interferes
with interstate commerce.

The Revised West Valley City Ordinance

effectively precludes breeders and husbandmen such as appellant
from

transporting

game

fowl

to

-10-

be

used

for

fighting

in

jurisdictions where the sport is legal.
is preempted by federal law.

Moreover, the ordinance

The United States Congress enacted

legislation specifically permitting the interstate shipment of
game fowl for fighting ventures in States where such ventures are
lawful.

The ordinance directly conflicts with the objective of

congress which chose to protect said activity and is therefore
invalid under the supremacy clause.
Revised

West

Valley

City

Ordinance

23-5-104(8)

unconstitutionally interferes with the right to own and possess
property, in violation
Constitution.

of Article

I Section

1 of the Utah

Any restriction upon constitutionally protected

property rights must be balanced against the alleged evil sought
to be corrected

and the limitation of constitutional rights

imposed by the ordinance.

In the instant case, the conduct

proscribed has no effect whatsoever on the inhabitants of West
Valley City because the fighting of fowl owned by Appellant
occurs outside of the territorial limits of West Valley City.
Therefore, the ordinance is unconstitutional pursuant to Article
I, Section
deprives

1 of

the

Utah

defendant/appellant

Constitution
of

as

it

unjustifiably

constitutionally

protected

property rights.
ARGUMENT
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANTS MOTION TO DISMISS
AND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AS REVISED WEST VALLEY
CITY ORDINANCE 23-5-104 VIOLATES THE UNITED STATES AND
UTAH CONSTITUTIONS.
-11-

A.

REVISED WEST VALLEY CITY ORDINANCE 23-5-104(8) IS IN CONFLICT
WITH GENERAL LAW AND IS THEREFORE CONSTITUTIONALLY INVALID
PURSUANT TO ARTICLE XI, SECTION 5 OF THE UTAH STATE
CONSTITUTION.
The ordinance

at issue herein

is ostensibly

adopted to

promote the health, safety and morals of the inhabitants of West
Valley City.

Revised West Valley City Ordinance 23-5-104 (8) (a)

(hereinafter RWVCO 23-5-104 (8) (a)) provides, in pertinent part:
CRUELTY TO ANIMALS PROHIBITED
Animals for fighting:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person or
corporation to raise, keep or use any animal, fowl or
bird for the purpose of fighting or baiting;
The ordinance in question constitutes an improper exercise
of the powers granted to West Valley City by the State of Utah
and is constitutionally invalid as it conflicts with general law
and is void as ultra vires.
As a chartered city, West Valley City is granted, inter
alia, certain police powers by the State legislature to enact
2
ordinances and regulations for the benefit of the municipality.
In

addition

to

constitutionally

Article XI, Section
provides in pertinent part:

conferred

powers,

enabling

5 of the Utah State Constitution

Each city forming its charter under this section shall
have, and is hereby granted, the authority to adopt and
enforce within its limits, local police, sanitary and
similar regulations not in conflict with general law ...
(emphasis added).
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statutes such as the general welfare clause, provide municipal
authority to enact ordinances, not repugnant to law, which are
necessary to provide for the safety, health, morals and welfare
3
of the city and its inhabitants.
The police powers of West
Valley City are strictly limited to those expressly granted by
state constitution or statute.

Nance v. Mayflower Tavern, Inc.,

150 P.2d 773 (1944); Salt Lake City v. Sutter, 216 P.234 (1923);
1 C Antieua, Municipal Corporation Law Section 5.01 (1967); 1 E
McQuillin, Municipal Corporations Section 1.93 (3d Ed. 1949).

A

municipal ordinance which exceeds the authority conferred by
statute is invalid as ultra vires and unconstitutional as in
conflict with general law.

See e.g. , Ritholz v. City of Salt

Lake, 284 P.2d 702 (1955); Gronlund v. Salt Lake City, 194 P.2d
464, 466 (1948); State v. Salt Lake City, 445 P.2d 691 (1968).

§10-8-84, Utah Code Annotated (1992) as amended provides:
Ordinances, Rules and regulations - Passage-Penalties
They may pass all ordinances and rules, and make all
regulations, not repugnant to law, necessary for the carrying
into effect or discharging all powers and duties conferred by
this chapter, and as are necessary and proper to provide for the
safety and preserve the health, and promote the prosperity,
improve the morals, peace and good order, comfort and convenience
of the city and its inhabitants, and for the protection of
property in the city; and may enforce obedience to the ordinances
with fines or penalties as they may deem proper, but the
punishment of any offense shall be by fine not to exceed the
maximum class B misdemeanor fine under Section 76-3-301 or by
imprisonment not to exceed six months, or by both the fine and
imprisonment.
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While the police power conferred to West Valley City under
the general welfare clause is broad in scope and its legitimate
objects

are

broad

and

comprehensive,

it

is,

nevertheless

fundamental that the police power is limited to the promulgation
and enforcement of measures reasonably related to a legitimate
object for its exercise, including the public health, morals,
comfort and safety of the municipalities inhabitants. McQuillin,
Municipal

Corporations,

Section

24.09

(3rd

Edition).

Accordingly, the police power conferred upon West Valley City by
the State of Utah is not an infinite and unlimited power.

Id.

See also, State v. Hutchison, 624 P.2d 1116, 1128 (Utah 1980)
(Although the general welfare clause has been afforded liberal
construction, it does not grant municipalities carte blanch nor
limitless

power

to

enact

restrictive

ordinances

under

the

auspices of protecting the safety, health and welfare of its
citizenry).
substantial

Rather,
and

only

reasonable

those

ordinances

relationship

to

which
the

bear

objects

a
of

protecting the general welfare may be upheld as a valid exercise
of West Valley City's police power.
1116, 1126

State v. Hutchison, 624 P.2d

(1980)(When the state has granted general welfare

powers to local governments, those governments have independent
authority

to

pass

ordinances

which

are

reasonably

and

appropriately related to the objectives of that power, i.e.,
providing for the public safety health, morals and welfare);
Parker

v.

Provo

City

Corp.,

543
-14-

P.2d

769

(1975)(Municipal

ordinances enacted to protect public health, safety, welfare and
well-being must bear reasonable relation to purposes).
The

issue

in the

instant case

is thus reduced

to the

question of whether the challenged ordinance is substantially and
reasonably

related

to

the

promotion

of

the

prosperity

and

improvement of the health, safety and morals of the inhabitants
of West Valley City.

The circumstances of this case compel a

negative answer; there is neither a substantial nor reasonable
relationship between the alleged evil to be prevented (to raise,
keep or use fowl or birds for the purpose of fighting or baiting)
and the protection of the safety, health and morals of the
citizens of West Valley City.
In the instant case, the alleged evil sought to be corrected
ostensibly has a demeaning and detrimental effect on the morals
of the inhabitants of West Valley City.

However, the detrimental

effect could only occur if the activity to be prevented, the
fighting of fowl or birds, occurred within the boundaries of West
Valley City where the citizenry may witness or otherwise be
4
directly or indirectly effected by the activity.
There is

In Peck v. Dunn, 574 P.2d 367 (1978), the Utah Supreme
Court recognized that "it is now generally thought that the
witnessing of animals fighting, injuring and perhaps killing one
another is a cruel and barbarous practice, discordant to man's
better instincts and so offensive to his finer sensibilities that
it is demeaning to morals. Id. at 369 (emphasis added). The
operative language in the court's statement is "witnessing."
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not a scintilla of evidence in this record on appeal that the
fowl raised by Appellant is utilized for the purpose of fighting
within West Valley City or within the State of Utah.

To the

contrary, the record reflects that Appellant utilizes the birds,
raised and kept at his residence, for fighting in jurisdictions
far distant from Utah, including Arizona (R-l. 37, (T. 20, In.
15-18, 21, In 11-14).
It is inconceivable that the fighting of fowl or birds
outside the State of Utah could have any affect or impact,
detrimental or otherwise, on the citizenry of West Valley City.
The act of raising, keeping, or using fowl or birds for the
purpose of fighting outside of the geographical boundaries of
West Valley City has no tenable relationship whatsoever to the
general welfare of West Valley City citizens.

Similarly, the act

of selling or transferring game fowl to third persons who may
eventually

utilize

the

birds

for

fighting

in

a

foreign

jurisdiction has no impact whatsoever on the morals of West
Valley City inhabitants.5 Accordingly, the proscribed activity

Presumably, if the activity does not occur within a
locality where citizens may witness or otherwise be effected by
the activity there is no direct or indirect impact upon the
morals of the numbers of the community.
5
The act of raising does not require the birds to be fought.
To the contrary, the raising of specific fighting breeds of birds
require the birds be kept separate in order to prevent injury as
the birds will fight instinctively if kept together.
J.W.
Cooper, M.D., Game Fowls, Their Origin and History, p. 35
(standard edition) (1869).
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does not so effect the morals and welfare as to justify the
interdiction imposed by RWVCO 23-5-104(8).

Any other finding

would be unconstitutional as the challenged ordinance would be
given extraterritorial effect, in violation of the due process
g
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
Moreover, a finding of validity would be inconsistent with state
precedent.

The Utah Supreme Court has struck down as ultra vires

numerous ordinances enacted under the general welfare clause
which

proscribed

conduct

not

immediately

related

to

the

protection of public welfare, including ordinances that sought to
7
8
prohibit keeping pin ball machines, playing pool, advertising
9
10
1
prescription eyeglasses, fixing barbershops closing hours,
It is axiomatic that West Valley City has no authority to
legislate beyond the boundaries of the municipality. American
Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.y 213 U.S. 347 (1909) (A Statute
must be limited In its operation and effect to the territorial
limits over which the lawmaker has general and legitimate power.
Id. at 357. All legislation is prima facie territorial.) Id.
RWVCO 23-5-104(8) clearly constitutes an extraterritorial
criminal statute as it allows criminal prosecution of an
individual who may "raise, keep or use fowl or birds for the
purpose of fighting" without requiring proof that the owner
intends to engage in animal fighting within the geographic
boundaries of West Valley City, or even within the State of Utah.
7

Stevenson v. Salt Lake City, 317 P.2d 597 (1957).

o

American Fork City v. Robinson, 292 P.249 (1930).
9

Ritholz v. City of Salt Lake, 284 P.2d 702 (1955).

10

Salt Lake City v. Revenue, 124 P.2d 537 (1942).
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and possessing alcohol without authorization.
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the ordinance at
issue does not satisfy the test of validity required by law as
there is no substantial or reasonable relationship between the
conduct proscribed thereunder and the protection of the general
welfare
evidence

of

the* citizens of West Valley

in this record

on appeal

City.

that the

Appellant is fought in West Valley City.

There

is no

fowl raised by

Accordingly, there is

no tenable relationship whatsoever between the alleged evil to be
prevented and the moral well being of the community.
the challenged

ordinance

is an improper and

Thereforef

unconstitutional

exercise of Appellee's state endowed police powers and is invalid
as ultra vires and as in conflict with general law.
B.

WEST VALLEY CITY ORDINANCE §23-5-104(8)(a) IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL, BEING VOID FOR BOTH VAGUENESS AND
OVERBREADTH.
Appellant submits that RWVCO §23-5-104 (8) (a), which provides

that

fl

[i]t shall be unlawful for any person or corporation to

raise, keep or use any animal, fowl or bird for the purpose of
fighting or baiting;" regardless of whether such "fowl or bird"
engages in fighting or baiting within the boundaries of West
Valley City, is unconstitutional as being void for vagueness and
overbreadth, in violation of Article I, Section 7 and Article I,

Salt Lake City v. Sutter, 216 P.234 (1923).
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Section 1 of the Constitution of the State of Utah, and the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States,
I. VAGUENESS
The

due

Amendments

process

clause

to the United

of

the

Fourth

States Constitution

and

Fourteenth

require that a

criminal statute be declared void when it is so vague that "men
of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application."
269 U.S. 385, 391

Connally v. General Constr. Co.,

(1926); see also Roberts v. United States

Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 629 (1984); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S.
379 (1979).
The Supreme Court has explained the relationship between due
process and vagueness as follows:
It is a basic principle of due process that an
enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are
not clearly defined.
Vague laws offend several
important values. First, because we assume that man is
free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we
insist that laws give the person of ordinary
intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is
prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws;
may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning.
Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is
to be prevented, laws must provide explicit standards
for those who apply them. A vague law impermissibly
delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges,
and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective
basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and
discriminatory application. Third, but related, where
a vague statute "abuts upon sensitive areas of basic
First Amendment freedoms," it "operates to inhibit the
12
A statute which is uncertain as to persons who may fall
within its scope will also be found unconstitutionally vague.
See Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939).
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exercise of those freedoms."
Uncertain meanings
inevitably lead citizens to "'steer far wider of the
unlawful zone1 . . . than if the boundaries of the
forbidden areas were clearly marked."
Grayned

v.

City

of

Rockford,

(1972) (citations omitted).

408

U.S.

104,

108-09

See also Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S.

352jf 257-58 (1983) (citations omitted) ("where the legislature
fails

to

provide

.

.

. minimal

guidelines

[to govern

law

enforcement], a criminal statute may permit 'a standardless sweep
that allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their
personal predilections1.") 13 ; Dae Woo Kim v. City of New York,
774 F.Supp.

164, 169

(S.D.N.Y. 1991)

(citations omitted)

(a

statute is unconstitutionally vague if it "lacks clear definition
or explicit standards sush that it does not give a person of
ordinary

intelligence

an

opportunity

to

know

what

is

prohibited").
The Utah Supreme Court has articulated a similar test for
vagueness.

In State v. Blowers, 717 P.2d 1321 (1986), the Utah

Supreme Court struck down a conviction applying a driving while
intoxicated ordinance to the rider of a horse, stating that "[a]

The three standards set forth by the court are independent
of each other. Thus, a statute may offend due process simply by
violating one of the three standards. See generally LaFave and
Scott, Substantive Criminal Law, Section 2.3, at 128-32 (1986).
See also NAACP v. Burton, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
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criminal statute

'must be sufficiently clear and definite to

inform persons of ordinary intelligence what their conduct must
be to conform to its requirements and to advise one accused of
violating

it what constitutes

charged1."

the offense with which he is

Id. at 1322, citing Greaves v. State, 528 P.2d 805,

807 (Utah 1974) (citations omitted).

The court held the attempt

by the State to apply the Utah Motor Vehicle Code to persons
riding animals on a municipal roadway was too vague to survive
constitutional due process challenge.
Thus, the preliminary question to be determined by this
Court is whether RWVCO §23-5-104(8) (a) gives a person of ordinary
intelligence

"a

reasonable

opportunity

to

prohibited, so that he may act accordingly."
clear that a person of ordinary intelligence

know

what

Grayned.

is

It is

likely may not

understand what it is to "raise, keep or use any animal, fowl or
bird for the purpose of fighting or baiting," since the ordinance
fails to state the territorial boundaries of the proscribed
conduct.

Consequently, it would be almost impossible that such a

person can reasonably conduct himself or herself to conform to
such a law.
Relying on the principle enunciated in Grayned, the Kansas
Supreme Court recently
ordinance.

struck down a Wichita erotic dancing

In City of Wichita v. Wallace, 788 P. 2d 270 (Kan.

1990), the court found the Wichita ordinance unconstitutionally
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vague for a number of reasons, including failure to adequately
define

the

proscribed

conduct, overbreadth,

require a scienter or intent requirement.
that

the

West

Valley

City

Id.

Ordinance

and

failure

to

Appellant submits
contains

numerous

deficiencies similar to those found in the Wichita ordinance.
Subsection

(8) (a) , under which

Appellant was

convicted,

lacks a scienter or intent requirement, thereby rendering the
ordinance void for vagueness.
324 U.S. 246, 250

(1952)

See Morisette v. United States,

(fundamental principle of American

criminal jurisprudence is "that an injury can amount to a crime
only

when

inflicted

by

intention.").

For

example,

under

§23-5-104(8)(a), virtually anyone who owns fowl or birds for the
purpose of raising to sell for participation in animal fighting
ventures in a jurisdiction in which fighting or baiting is legal,
is

subject

to

criminal

ownership of the gamefowl.

prosecution,

based

upon

their

mere

The ordinance does not require that

an individual be charged with fighting such animals, fowl or
birds in the State of Utah; it does not distinguish between
ownership" for the purpose of fighting or baiting" in states
where the sport is legal and states where it is not; it does not
distinguish between breeding and selling such birds for "fighting
or baiting" to breeders in states where the sport of gamefighting
is legal and states where it is not.

Rather, the statute sweeps

with a broad brush and encompasses ownership of any bird which is
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kept

or

raised

for

"fighting

or baiting"

even

though

that

activity is perfectly legal in certain states, and has been so
for

a

hundred

years.

unknowingly possesses

(R-2. 57)

Therefore, a

person

who

fowl or birds which could be used for

"fighting or baiting," or which may be sold in a state where such
"fighting or baiting" is legal, would be punished under RWVCO
§23-5-104 (8) (a).

The

Kansas

Supreme

Court

found

a

similar

ordinance lacking an intent requirement to be unconstitutionally
vague.

This Court should similarly declare RWVCO §23-5-104(8)(a)

unconstitutionally vague for violating the basic criminal rule
that no crime is committed unless the suspect acted with a
criminal intent.
II.

OVERBREADTH

In addition to being unconstitutionally vague, Appellant
asserts

that

RWVCO

overbroad, because

§23-5-104(8) (a)

a person

is

of ordinary

unconstitutionally
intelligence

cannot

discern what is actually being prohibited by the ordinance and
because it includes within its prohibitions legitimate and lawful
conduct.

The void-for-vagueness doctrine and the doctrine of

overbreadth are related but distinct.
"denies

due

process

by

imposing

A vague law or ordinance
standards

of

conduct

so

indeterminate that it is impossible to ascertain just what will
result in sanctions; in contrast, a law that is overbroad may be
perfectly clear but impermissibly purport to penalize protected
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.

. . activity."

Hastings v. Judicial Conference of U.S., 485

U.S. 1014, 829 F.2d 91, 105 (D.C.Cir. 1987); see also Dae Woo Kim
v.

City

of

New

York,

774

F.Supp.

164,

170

(S.D.N.Y.

1991)

(quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. at 114) (a statute
is

"unconstitutionally

overbroad

if

it

includes

within

its

prohibitions constitutionally protected conduct").
In Logan City v. Huber, 786 P.2d 1372 (1990), the Utah Court
of Appeals

stiruck down

a

city

overbroad enactment is one

ordinance,

stating

that

"[a]n

'which does not aim specifically at

evils within the allowable area of state control but, on the
contrary,
ordinary

sweeps

within

its

circumstances

ambit

other

constitute

activities
an

that

exercise

in
of

[constitutionally guaranteed] freedomfs]'."

Id. at 1375, quoting

Waters v. McGuriman, 656 F.Supp. 923, 925

(E.D.Pa. 1987).

court

struck

obscene

down

or abusive

the Logan
language

City

ordinance, which

spoken with

the

intent

The

proscribed
"to cause

public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, or recklessly creating
a risk thereof," as being unconstitutionally overbroad, because
the

ordinance

"punishes

as

disorderly

conduct

a

significant

amount of protected verbal expression, including criticism and
challenge, vulgarities and remonstrations, whether it is directed
at a police officer, an ordinary citizen, or one who is not even
present, without regard for its likely impact
1376.
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. . .."

Id. at

In the instant case, RWVCO §23-5-104(8)(a) is overbroad in
numerous respects.

The ordinance provides that an individual

commits a crime if he: "raise[s], keep[s] or use[s] any animal,
fowl or bird for the purpose of fighting or baiting . . .."

The

problem with this sweeping language is that it prohibits conduct,
such as the simple possession of the game birds in West Valley
City, which may be utilized for legal and legitimate activities
in foreign jurisdictions.
Section

23-5-104 (8) (a) is overbroad because it rests on

"confusing and ambiguous criteria" which are subject to varying
interpretations by those who enforce and are effected by the
statute.

Colautti, supra; Kolender, supra.

There is little

question that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess
as to its meaning and differ as to its application.
City of North Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 816 (Utah 1991).

Greenwood v.
It is unclear

if the ordinance simply proscribes ownership of birds which are
actively being used for "fighting and baiting" in the State of
Utah, or prohibits the possession of gamefowl in the State of
Utah, where the owner occasionally drives to Arizona and uses the
bird for "fighting or baiting" where the sport is legal.

One

cannot reasonably determine whether it prohibits breeding and
raising gamefowl in the State of Utah - without fighting such
gamefowl - and selling the hatchlings to members of Gamefowl
Breeders Associations in Arizona, where they will legally be used
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for "fighting or baiting" by members of those organizations.
Therefore, RWVCO §23-5-104(8)(a) is both vague and overbroad,
because it does not allow an individual of common intelligence to
know whether he or she has committed a crime, and it sweeps
within its ambit activities which are perfectly legitimate.
In addition, the ordinance invites unequal and arbitrary
enforcement
Valley

(Kolender, supra; Colautti, supra.) because West
14
City Ordinance §2-102-8
allows the "Animal Control

Director or any person employed by the Department of Animal
Control as an Animal Control Officer" ad hoc judgment as to which
birds are being owned and raised for "fighting and baiting"

—

without requiring proof that the bird has actually been used for
animal fighting in the State of Utah —
subjective

judgment

is

interjected

an enormous amount of
into the statute.15 The

ordinance is therefore unconstitutionally overbroad as it creates

West Valley City Ordinance §23-1-102(2), which is not at
issue in the instant case, delineates the "Powers of Animal
Control Officers," and vests authority in the "Animal Control
Director or any person employed by the Department of Animal
Control as an Animal Control Officer" to have the authority and
power to "apprehend and take with them and impound any animal
found in violation of this ordinance."
If fighting paraphernalia is discovered in proximity of a
bird, this ordinance seems to allow the inference that the owner
possesses the bird for "fighting or baiting" and justify that the
owner become the subject of a criminal prosecution, even though
the use of such paraphernalia is equally common to gamefowl
raised for show purposes, and never fought. (T. 17).
-26-

a "standardless sweep [that] allows policemen, prosecutors, and
juries to pursue their personal predilections."

Kolender, supra,

461 U.S. at 358.
Finally, RWVCO, which allows criminal prosecution where an
individual keeps, raises or uses a fowl or bird for the purpose
of fighting or baiting without requiring proof that the owner
intends to engage in animal fighting within West Valley City, or
even in the State of Utah, is overbroad as it amounts to an
extraterritorial

criminal

process

of

clause

Constitution.

the

statute,
Fourteenth

in

violation

Amendment

of
of

the
the

due
U.S.

RWVCO is limited in its operation and effect to

the territorial limits over which the West Valley City Council
has general and legitimate power.

American Banana Co. v. United

Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, (1909).

All legislation is prima facie

territorial.

Id. at 357.

Accordingly, West Valley City simply

cannot sweep within the proscribed

conduct of the ordinance

legitimate

foreign

activities

occurring

in

jurisdictions

far

beyond its territorial boundaries.
Accordingly, the ordinance is unconstitutionally overbroad
as it fails to specifically aim at evils within the allowable
area of state control and
activities

which

constitute

protected freedoms.

sweeps with
an

exercise

its ambit
of

legitimate

constitutionally

Logan City v. Huber, 786 P.2d 1372, 1375

(1990) .
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Based upon the

foregoing, this court

23-5-104(8) unconstitutional

as being void

should

find RWVCO

for vagueness, in

addition to being overbroad.
C.

RWVCO UNCONSTITUTIONALLY INTERFERES WITH INTERSTATE
COMMERCE AND TRAVEL AND IS FEDERALLY PREEMPTED BY
7 U.S.C. §2156(d).
RWVCO 23-5-104 (8) , which makes it a criminal offense to

"raise, keep, or use" a fowl or bird for the purpose of fighting,
violates the right to travel implicit in the United States and
Utah

Constitutions

as

well

as

interferes

with

interstate

commerce.
The challenged ordinance does not limit itself to outlawing
cockfighting within the boundaries of the State of Utah.

Rather,

the ordinance imposes a blanket prohibition upon the "keep[ing],
rais[ing], or us[ing] any game fowl for the purpose of animal
fighting"

thus

creating

a

criminal

offense

for

the

mere

possession (i.e. keeping) of birds which one intends to transport
to another State for use where cockfighting is legal.
Such an overreaching law impinges upon the fundamental right
to travel embodied
Constitution.

in the Fourteenth Amendment

of the U.S.

See Shapiro v. ThompsonP 394 U.S. 618 (1969).

It

also impinges upon the right to travel implicit in Article I,
Section 1 of the Utah Constitution.
The Ordinance at issue impinges upon the rights to travel
interstate, and the right to engage in interstate commerce, of
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citizens of all fifty states, by prohibiting individuals from
travelling through West Valley City in possession of gamefowl
which is intended to be used "for animal fighting/1 even if such
fighting is to take place in a state where the sport is perfectly
legal.

Under the ordinance, if a citizen of Arizona, (where the

sport is legal) travels through West Valley City on the way to a
cockfight in Puerto Rico (where the sport is also legal), he or
she is guilty of a criminal offense.

Similarly, if a West Valley

City resident raises birds for cockfighting, as appellant does,
and ships them from the Salt Lake City Airport to Arizona (where
the sport is legal) , he or she is guilty of a criminal offense.
The statute thus unconstitutionally impedes the flow of commerce
interstate and violates the constitutional right of interstate
travel both of residents of West Valley City and residents of all
fifty States.
The

egregious

constitutional

violation

imposed

by

the

ordinance, which essentially bans Appellant from raising fowl and
from transporting fowl or traveling with fowl to cockfighting
competitions
evidenced

by

in States where the sport is legal, is further
the

fact

that

the

United

States

Congress

has

preempted the area by permitting such activity.
In 1976, Congress enacted significant amendments to Title 7
U.S.C.,

Section

2156,

entitled

"Animal

Prohibition," which made it unlawful to:
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Fighting

Venture

(a) sponsor or exhibit

an animal fighting venture;

(b) Buy, sell, deliver or transport

any animal in interstate commerce for participation in any animal
fighting venture;17 or(c) Use the mail services of the U.S.
Postal Service to promote animal fighting. 18
Significantly, Congress created a specific exemption for
individuals who own birds and transport them to States where
fighting ventures are legal.

Subsection (d) of 7 U.S.C. §2156

provides:
Violation of State Law; Notwithstanding the provisions
of subsections (a) , (b) or (c) of this section, the
activities prohibited by such subsections shall be
unlawful with respect to fighting ventures involving
live birds only if the fight is to take place in a
State where it would be in violation of the laws
thereof. Id. (emphasis added)

7 U.S.C. 2156(a) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly sponsor or
exhibit an animal in any animal fighting venture to which any
animal was moved in interstate or foreign commerce.
17

7 U.S.C. 2156(b) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly sell, buy,
transport, or deliver to another person or receive from another
person for purposes of transportation, in interstate or foreign
commerce, any dog or other animal for purposes of having the dog
or other animal participate in an animal fighting venture.
18

7 U.S.C. 2156(c) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly use the
mail service of the United States Postal Service or any
interstate instrumentality for purposes of promoting or in any
other manner furthering an animal fighting venture except as
performed outside the limits of the States of the United States.
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Thus Congress has entered this area of regulation and has
explicitly and/or implicitly created a right to travel interstate
for the purpose of selling, breeding, or fighting live birds
where the sport of cockfighting is legal.

The federal statute

thus serves to preempt State laws which would enter the sphere of
regulation in which Congress has already acted, and prevents
States from enacting laws which come in conflict with the federal
scheme.
Congress has specifically provided for preemption in this
area, as evidence by 7 U.S.C. 2156(h), which provides:
Conflict with State Law
the provisions of this chapter shall not supersede or
otherwise invalidate any such State, local, or
municipal legislation or ordinance relating to animal
fighting ventures except in case of a direct and
irreconcilable
conflict between
any
requirements
thereunder and this chapter or any rule, regulation, or
standard hereunder. Id. (emphasis added).
Since Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (1824) the United States
Supreme

Court

has

emphasized

that

"acts

of

the

State

Legislatures. . . [which] interfere with, or are contrary to the
laws of Congress, made in pursuance of the constitution," are
invalid under the Supremacy Clause.

Id. at 211. The keystone of

federal preemption analysis is the determination of whether a
challenged

State

statute

"stands

as

an

obstacle

to

the

accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives
of Congress."

Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); Perez

v. Campbell, 401 U.S. 637, 649 (1970).
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In Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp,, 331 U.S. 218 (1946), the
Court held that congressional intent to preempt state regulations
could be evidenced "if the enactment of a state policy produces a
result inconsistent with the objective of the federal statute."
Id. at 230.

Even "when congress has not completely displaced

state regulations, federal law may nonetheless preempt state law
to the extent that it actually conflicts with

federal law."

California Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 107 S.Ct. 683,
689 (1987) .

This is particularly true if compliance with both

laws may be physically impossible or the state law may stand "as
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress."

Id.

(quoting Florida Lime

& Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-143 (1963)).
In the instant case, RWVCO 23-5-104(8) clearly produces a
result inconsistent with the objective of the federal statute.
Id.

Congressional intent, apparent in the text of the act, was

to permit the shipment of birds to States where cockfighting is
lawful, despite the lawfulness of cockfighting in the State of
origin.

The West Valley City Ordinance makes it impossible for

West Valley City breeders and husbandmen, such as Appellant, to
ship birds from Utah to other States or countries, because, under
the ordinance, any possession of the birds in West Valley City
with

intent

that

they

be

fought

anywhere

in

the world

is

unlawful, even if that activity is legal in the State or country
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of destination.

Thus, the West Valley City Ordinance makes

criminal the very activity Congress specifically chose to exempt
from prosecution under the federal law.
The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently struck down State
laws where their "administration . . . would conflict with the
operation of the federal plan."

City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air

Terminal, 411 U.S. 624, 539 (1972); Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350
U.S. 497, 509 (1955); Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485,
490-91

(1951).

The

West

Valley

City

Ordinance

creates

an

"irreconcilable conflict" with federal law, as embodied in 7
U.S.C. Section 2156, Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., supra.
Indeed, the legislative history of the federal statute indicates
that the interstate shipment of gamefowl for breeding purposes,
and for fighting ventures in States where such ventures are
lawful, is a protected activity under the statute. See, Pub.L.
19
94-279, 1976 U.S. Code Cong, and Adm. News., p.797.
Therefore,
the challenged ordinance which prohibits Appellant from keeping

The intent of 7 U.S.C, 2156(d) is evidenced by the
following conference substitute contained in the legislative
history of the Animal Welfare Act: The Conference substitute
adopts the House provision with an amendment which provides that
the activities prohibited by subsections (a), (b), or (c) of new
section 26 of the act shall be unlawful with respect to fighting
ventures involving live birds only if the fight is to take place
in a State where it would be in violation of the laws thereof.
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or raising game fowl ultimately to be fought in places where such
fighting is lawful, conflicts with federal law and is invalid
under the supremacy clause.
D.

WEST VALLEY CITY ORDINANCE §23-5-104(8) (a) IS VIOLATIVE
OF SECTION 1 ARTICLE I OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION AND
THEREFORE VOID AS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTION UPON THE
RIGHT TO OWN AND POSSESS PROPERTY.
"All men have the inherent and inalienable right to ...

possess and protect property."
Article I, Section 1, Constitution of Utah.
RWVCO 23-5-104(8) runs head long into this constitutional
guarantee when it makes it unlawful to raise, keep, or use a fowl
or bird for admittedly legal purposes, which have no effect upon
the public interest or general welfare of the citizens of West
Valley City.
The city did not contend below that the raising and keeping
of fighting cocks, alone, would run afoul (no pun intended) of
city ordinances.

Rather it is the raising of birds for the

purposes of fighting which is claimed to subject appellant to
criminal sanctions.

The section does not apply to export of live birds to foreign
countries nor to interstate shipment of live birds for breeding
purposes. Game fowl publications would be unaffected except that
advertising of fights involving live birds would be prohibited
except in those instances where such fights are to be held in a
State or territory where they are not unlawful.
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In determining the propriety of such a proscriptionf any
limitation

imposed upon the constitutional

right to own and

possess property in light of Article I, Section 1 of Utah's
Constitution "must take into consideration the balance between
the alleged evil sought to be corrected and the limitation on
constitutional rights the ordinance would impose."

Ritholz v.

City of Salt Lake, 284 P.2d 702, 705 (S.Ct. Utah 1955).
Ritholz dealt with a city ordinance which sought to prohibit
advertising the price of prescription eyeglasses.

In holding the

ordinance unconstitutional, the court noted the lack of evidence
"to show any relationship between advertising eyewear and public
health."

Id^ at 704.

Similarly there has been no showing, nor can there be, that
Appellant's subjective intent, to engage some of his fowl in
legal sport outside of this state, creates some "evil" or "hazard
to public health" against which Appellant's right to possess and
raise game cocks must be balanced.
Just as the Ritholz court prevented the city from unduly
restraining the advertising and business practices of persons who
sought to advertise eyewear, the Utah Constitution does not allow
West Valley City to interfere with Appellant's business or hobby
of raising show and game cocks absent a nexus between that
activity and some dilitarious affect on public health, welfare or
morals.

See also, Pride Oil Co. v. Salt Lake County, 370 P.2d
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355

(Utah

1962)

(restrained

as

unconstitutional

a

statute

relating to posting of gasoline prices.)
Appellant does not contend that his property rights are
absolute

-

where

some

important

public

interest

requires

safeguarding of health, morals, safety or welfare - even the most
basic property rights may be limited.

The problem with the

present ordinance however is that in its application to Appellant
it punishes conduct which will take place if at all, outside of
the City of West Valley.

Therefore, it cannot seriously be

questioned

to

that

the

evil

be

corrected

has

no

tenable

relationship whatsoever to protecting the public interest of the
citizenry of West Valley City.

Accordingly, the ordinance is

unconstitutional as it unjustifiably infringes upon Appellant's
constitutionally protected right to own, possess and use his
property.
Appellant's property rights should not be made to yield to
meer convenience and expediency.

It is the function of this

court to look beyond the first blush impression of the enactment
to see whether there is a sound basis to justify the city in
proscribing and prosecuting Appellant's act of raising poultry
with the intent to use them in a legal fashion outside of the
State.

See, Backman v. Bateman, 263 P.2d 561, (S.Ct. Utah 1953).

Accordingly, RWVCO 23-5-104(8) is unconstitutional pursuant to
Article I, Section 1 of the Utah State Constitution as there is
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no justifiable basis thereunder for imposing limitations upon
Appellant's constitutionally protected property rights.
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT
Based

on

the

unconstitutional

foregoing,

and

defendant/appellant's
Reconsideration.
conviction

of

the
Motion

cruelty

to

court
to

Accordingly,

RWVCO

23-5-104(8)(a)
erred

Dismiss

the

animals,

and

Appellant's
in

in

is

denying

Motion

for

judgment

and

violation

of

RWVCO

23-5-104(8)(a), heretofore entered by Judge William A. Thorne,
Jr. in the Third Circuit Court in and for Salt Lake County, West
Valley Department, State of Utah, should be overturned.
DATED this //

day of September, 1992.
CONDER & WANGSGARD

Micelle J. \v}4/

\s

Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the //t//%y of September, 1992, I
caused to be mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to the following
counsel of record:
J. Richard Catten
West Valley City Prosecutor
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent
3600 South 2700 West
West Valley City, Utah 84119
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Of CONDER & WANGSGARD
Attorneys for Defendant
4059 South 4000 West
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IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WEST VALLEY CITY,
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT
CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL
AND ORDER

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 901001677 MC
Judge William A. Thorne

DENNIS STREETER,
Defendant.

COMES NOW, DENNIS STREETER, the defendant in this case and
hereby acknowledges and certifies the following:
I have entered a plea of guilty to the following crimes of
(1) Doing Business without a License, violation of West Valley
City Municipal Ordinance i 17-1-102;
Zone, to wit:
violation

of

(2) Improper Use For R-l-8

Operating a poultry business in an R-18 zone,
West

Valley

City

Ordinance

7-9-103;

and

(3)

Accumulation of Solid Waste & Littering, violation of West Valley
City Municipal Ordinance 24-1-11.. I further enter a conditional
guilty plea to the charge of Cruelty to Animals, a violation of
West

Valley

City

Ordinance

23-5-104,

and

enter

said

plea

conditionally, specifically reserving the right to challenge the
constitutionality of said ordinance on appeal.
I understand that the penalties provided for my plea of
guilty to the above referenced violations are as follows:
17-1-102, 7-9-103, and 24-1-11 are class B Misdemeanors for which
a maximum fine of $1,000.00 may be imposed and/or a maximum
sentence of six months imprisonment for each offense.
understand that the penalties provided

I further

for violation of West

Valley City Municipal Ordinance 23-5-104, a class B Misdemeanor,
to which I am entering a conditional plea, carries a maximum fine
of $1,000.00 and/or maximum imprisonment of up to six months in
jail.

I have recieved a copy of the information against me.

I

have read it, and I understand the nature and the elements of the
offenses

for

which

I

am

entering

a

guilty

plea

and/or

a

conditional plea of guilty.
The elements of the crimes with which I am charged are as
follows:

A person commits cruelty to animals under WVC Ordinance

23-5-104 if he raises, keeps, or uses any animal, fowl or bird
for the purpose of fighting or baiting;
under

A person commits a crime

WVC Municipal Ordinance 17-1-102 if he operates a business

without a license;

A person commits a crime under WVC Municipal

Ordinance 7-9-103 if he operates a poultry business in a zone
designated as R-l-8; A person commits a crime under WVC Municipal
Ordinance 24-1-11 if he permits solid waste and/or litter to
-2-

accumulate on property where there exists no zoning authority to
do so,
I am entering this plea voluntarily and with knowledge and
understanding of the following facts:
1.

I know that I have the right to be represented by an

attorney and that if I cannot afford one, an attorney will be
appointed by the court at no cost to me.
2.

I have not waived my right to counsel.

My attorney is

Michelle J. Ivie and I have had an opportunity to discuss this
statement, my rights and the consequences of my guilty plea with
my attorney.
3.

I know that I have a right to a trial by jury.

4.

I know that if I wish to have a trial I have the right

to confront and cross-examine witnesses against me or to have
them cross-examined by my attorney.

I also know that I have the

right to compel my witness(es) by subpoena at state expense to
testify in court upon my behalf.
5.

I know that I have a right to testify in my own behalf

but if I choose not to do so I cannot be compelled to testify or
give evidence against myself and no adverse inferences will be
drawn against me if I do not testify.
6.

I know that if I wish to contest the charges against me

I need only plead "not guilty" and the matter will be set for
trial.

At the trial the State of Utah will have the burden of
-3-

proving each element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt.

If

the trial is before a jury, the verdict must be unanimous.
7.

I know that under the Constitution of Utah that if I

were tried and convicted by a jury or by the judge that I would
have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Utah
Court of Appeals or, where allowed, the Utah Supreme Court and
that if I could not afford to pay the* costs for such appeal,
those costs would be paid by the state.
8.

I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each

offense to which I plead guilty.

I know that by pleading guilty

to an offense that carries a minimum mandatory sentence that I
will be subjecting myself to serving a minimum mandatory sentence
for that offense.

I know that the sentences may be consecutive

and may be for a prison term, fine, or both.
addition

to

a

fine

a

twenty-five

percent

I know that in
(25%)

surcharge,

required by Utah Code Annotated §63-63a-4, will be imposed.

I

also know that I may be ordered by the court to make restitution
to any victim(s) of my crimes.
9.

I know that imprisonment may be for consecutive periods,

or the fine for additional amounts, if my plea is to more than
one charge.

I also know that if I am on probation, parole, or

awaiting sentencing on another offense of which I have been
convicted or to which I have plead guilty, my plea in the present
action may result in consecutive sentences being imposed upon me.
-4-

10.

I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am

waiving my statutory and constitutional rights set out in the
preceding paragraphs, with the exception of my conditional guilty
plea pursuant to which I specifically reserve my constitutional
right to appeal the validity of WVC Ordinance 23-5-104, I also
know that by entering such plea, I am admitting and do so admit
that I have committed the conduct alleged and I am guilty of the
crimes for which my plea is entered.
11.

My plea of guilty is the result of a plea bargain, to

wit: the prosecutor has agreed to dismiss the remaining counts of
the information against me.

As further part of that plea bar-

gain, the prosecutor has agreed to dismiss a case pending against
me in the circuit court before Judge William A. Thorne.

The

prosecution and defendant have also agreed that the defendant may
enter the plea set forth above while preserving the right to
appeal the court's ruling on the constitutionality and validity
of

West

Valley

City

Ordinance

23-5-104, and

the

defendant

expressly reserves his right to appeal the courtfs denial of his
motion to dismiss.
12.

I know and understand that if I desire to withdraw my

plea of guilty I must do so by filing a motion within thirty (30)
days after entry of my plea, but that if I do not receive probation the State will stipulate to the withdrawal of this plea.

-5-

13.

I know that any charge or sentencing concession or

recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a
reduction of the charges for sentencing made or sought by either
defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not binding on
the judge.

I also know that any opinions they express to me as

to what they believe the court may do are also not binding on the
court.
14.

No threats, coercion, or unlawful influence of any kind

have been made to induce me to plead guilty, and no promises
except those contained herein have been made to me.
15.

I have read this statement or I have had it read to me

by my attorney, and I understand its provisions.

I know that I

am free to change or delete anything contained in this statement.
I do not wish to make any changes because all of the statements
are correct.
16.

I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my

attorney.
17.

I am 43 years of age; I have attended high school and I

can read and understand the English language or an interpreter
has been provided to me.

I was not under the influence of any

drugs, medication or intoxicants which would impair my judgment
when the decision was made to enter the plea.

I am not presently

under the influence of any drug, medication or intoxicants which
impair my judgment.
-6-

18.

I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind,

mentally capable of understanding the proceedings and the consequences of my plea and free of any mental disease, defect or
impairment that would prevent me from knowingly, intelligently
and voluntarily entering my plea.

DATED this ,9V

day of /j/f /\ /?

SUBSCRIBED <MAND^WGREI Uo before me
ori^ls^J^^Sait^^^aqch, 1992.
l%>~%> ^^£l^l&J
I '^il:l^'

_3rATE0FjJTAH _j

, 1992.

Is C ^ ^ W ^ ^
><^^

~^/7

Notary Public

CERTIFICATE OF ATTORNEY^

I certify that I am the attorney for Dennis Streeter, the
defendant above, and that I know he has read the statement or
that I have read it to him and I have discussed it with him and
believe he fully understands the meaning of its contents and is
mentally and physically competent.

To the best of my knowledge

and belief after an appropriate investigation, the elements of
the crimes and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal
conduct are correctly stated and these, along with the other
representations and declarations made by the defendant in the
foregoing affidavit, are accurate and true.

MICHEZLE J. IVIE
Attorney for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in
the case against Dennis Streeter, defendant.

I have reviewed

this statement of the defendant and find that the declaration,
including the elements of the offense of the charge and the
factual

synopsis

constitutes

the

of

the

offense

defendant's
are

true

criminal

and

correct.

conduct
No

which

improper

inducements, threats or coercion to encourage a plea have been
offered defendant.
the

statement

and

The plea negotiations are fully contained in
in

the

attached

plea

supplemented on record before the court.

agreement

or

as

There is reasonable

cause to believe that the evidence would support the conviction
of defendant for the offense for which the plea is entered and
acceptance of the plea would serve the__public interest.
/
Z r/

KEITH L .

ttXh-

STONI

West Valley CitV Prosecutor
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ORDER
Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing statement
and the certification of the defendant and counsel, the court
witnesses the signatures and finds the defendant's plea of guilty
together with defendant's conditional plea of guilty, all freely
and voluntarily made and it is so ordered that the defendant's
plea of guilty, and conditional plea of guilty to the charges set
forth in the statement be accepted and entered,

DONE IN COURT this y/1^

day of

/ ^ L ^ ^C

WILLIAM^ A. THORNE
Pis£y±gt Court Judge
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, 1992,
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FILED
9 2 MAR 31 AM 8:51*
J. I V I E (#5723)
o f CONDER & WANGSGARD
Attorneys for Defendant
4059 South 4000 West
West Valley City, Utah 84120
Telephone: (801) 967-5500
Fax:
(801) 967-5563

CLERK OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
VALLET QEPT.

MICHELLE

tt'EST

IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WEST VALLEY CITY,

) AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT
) CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL
) AND ORDER

Plaintiff,
vs.

)
)
)

DENNIS STREETER,
Defendant.

Case No. 901001586

)

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

COMES NOW, DENNIS STREETER, the defendant in this case and
hereby acknowledges and certifies the following:
I have entered a conditional plea of guilty to the crime of
Cruelty to Animals, a violation of West Valley City Municipal
Ordinance 23-5-104, a Class B Misdemenaor as charged in Count I
of the information

filed against me.

penalties provided are as follows:
as

charged

in Count I, a maximum

imprisonment of up to six months.

I understand that the

For the Class B Misdemeanor
fine of

$1,000.00

and/or

I enter this plea of guilty

conditionally and specifically reserve my right to challenge the

constitutionality
23-5-104.

of

West

Valley

City

Municipal

Ordinance

I have received a copy of the information against me.

I have read it, and I understand the nature and the elements of
the offenses for which I am entering my conditional plea of
guilty.
The elements of the crime of which I am charged
follows:

is as

A person commits Cruelty to Animals if he raises, keeps

or uses any animal, fowl or bird for the purpose of fighting or
baiting.
I am entering this plea voluntarily and with knowledge and
understanding of the following facts:
I am entering this plea voluntarily and with knowledge and
understanding of the following facts:
1.

I know that I have the right to be represented by an

attorney and that if I cannot afford one, an attorney will be
appointed by the court at no cost to me.
2.

I have not waived my right to counsel.

My attorney is

Michelle J. Ivie and I have had an opportunity to discuss this
statement, my irights and the consequences of my guilty plea with
my attorney.
3.

I know that I have a right to a trial by jury.

4.

I know that if I wish to have a trial I have the right

to confront and cross-examine witnesses against me or to have
them cross-examined by my attorney.
-2-

I also know that I have the

right to compel my witnelss(es) by subpoena at state expense to
testify in court upon my behalf.
5.

I know that I h^ve a right to testify in my own behalf

but if I choose not to dd so I cannot be compelled to testify or
give evidence against myself and no adverse inferences will be
drawn against me if I do not testify.
6.

I know that if I wish to contest the charges against me

I need only plead "not guilty" and the matter will be set for
trial.

At the trial the State of Utah will have the burden of

proving each element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. If
the trial is before a jury, the verdict must be unanimous.
7.

I know that under the Constitution of Utah that if I

were tried and convicted by a jury or by the judge that I would
have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Utah
Court of Appeals or, where allowed, the Utah Supreme Court and
that if I could not afford to pay the costs for such appeal,
those costs would be paid- by the state.
8.

I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each

offense to which I plead guilty.

I know that by pleading guilty

to an offense that carries a minimum mandatory sentence that I
will be subjecting myself to serving a minimum mandatory sentence
for that offense.

I know that the sentences may be consecutive

and may be for a prison term, fine, or both.
addition

to

a

fine

a

twenty-five
-3-

percent

I know that in
(25%) surcharge,

required by Utah Code Annotated §63-63a-4, will be imposed.

I

also know that I may be ordered by the court to make restitution
to any victim(s) of my crimes.
9.

I know that imprisonment may be for consecutive periods,

or the fine for additional amounts, if my plea is to more than
one charge.

I also know that if I am on probation, parole, or

awaiting sentencing on another offense of which

I have been

convicted or to which I have plead guilty, my plea in the present
action may result in consecutive sentences being imposed upon me.
10.

I know and understand that by entering a conditional

plea of guilty, I am waiving my statutory and constitutional
rights set out in the preceding paragraphs, with the exception of
my constitutional right to challenge the constitutionality of
West Valley City Ordinance 23-5-102, pursuant to my conditional
guilty plea hereunder.

I also know that by entering such plea, I

am admitting cind do so admit that I have committed the conduct
alleged and I am guilty of the crime for which my plea is entered.
11.

My plea of guilty is the result of a plea bargain, to

wit: the prosecutor has agreed to dismiss the remaining counts of
the information against me.

As further part of that plea bar-

gain, the prosecutor has agreed to dismiss a case pending against
me in the circuit court before Judge William A. Thome.

The

prosecution and defendant have also agreed that the defendant may
-4-

enter the plea set forth above while preserving the right to
appeal the court's ruling on the constitutionality of West Valley
City Ordinance 23-5-104 and the defendant expressly reserves his
right to appeal the court's denial of his motion to dismiss.
12.

I know and understand that if I desire to withdraw my

plea of guilty I must do so by filing a motion within thirty (30)
days after entry of my pleaf but that if I do not receive probation the State will stipulate to the withdrawal of this plea.
13.

I know that any charge or sentencing concession or

recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a
reduction of the charges for sentencing made or sought by either
defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not binding on
the judge.

I also know that any opinions they express to me as

to what they believe the court may do are also not binding on the
court.
14.

No threats, coercion, or unlawful influence of any kind

have been made to induce me to plead guilty, and no promises
except those contained herein have been made to me.
15.

I have read this statement or I have had it read to me

by my attorney, and I understand its provisions.

I know that I

am free to change or delete anything contained in this statement.
I do not wish to make any changes because all of the statements
are correct.
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16.

I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my

attorney.
17.

I am 43 years of age; I have attended high school and I

can read and understand the English language or an interpreter
has been provided to me.

I was not under the influence of any

drugs, medication or intoxicants which would impair my judgment
when the decision was made to enter the plea.

I am not presently

under the influence of any drug, medication or intoxicants which
impair my judgment.
18.

I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind,

mentally capable of understanding the proceedings and the consequences of my plea and free of any mental disease, defect or
impairment that would prevent me from knowingly, intelligently
and voluntarily entering my plea.
DATED this ^ O

day of

A/) A

fc.

, 1992.

DENNIS STREETER
'SUBSCRIBED
SWORN to before me on this Q < ^
SUBSCRIBED AND SWC

msoiJLL,

, 1992.

NOTARY PUBLIC ~1

SHELLY DEAL
^V^rSlYViy

\£^

..' * /

,

Residing

We*» vaifcy C.t# 'Jt&n 64120

My Carn.-XMiswn ejtp*re« 4/12/94

STATE OF UTAH
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day of

CERTIFICATE OF ATTORNEY
I certify that I am the attorney for Dennis Streeter, the
defendant above, and that I know he has read the statement or
that I have read it to him and I have discussed it with him and
believe he fully understands the meaning of its contents and is
mentally and physically competent.

To the best of my knowledge

and belief after an appropriate investigation, the elements of
the crimes and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal
conduct are correctly stated and these, along with the other
representations and declarations made by the defendant in the
foregoing affidavit, are accurate and true.
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CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in
the case against Dennis Streeter, defendant.

I have reviewed

this statement of the defendant and find that the declaration,
including the elements of the offense of the charge and the
factual

synopsis

constitutes

the

of

the

offense

defendant's
are

true

and

criminal
correct.

conduct
No

which

improper

inducements, threats or coercion to encourage a plea have been
offered defendant.
the

statement

and

The plea negotiations are fully contained in
in

the

attached

plea

supplemented on record before the court.

agreement

or

as

There is reasonable

cause to believe that the evidence would support the conviction
of defendant for the offense for which the plea is entered and
acceptance of the plea would serve the-""ptrbiic interest*

KEITH L. STONEY/
West Valley Ci£y Prosecutor

-8-

ORDER
Based upon the
and

the

certification

witnesses
plea

of

ordered

facts

the

of

signatures

guilty,

all

set
the
and

freely

that the defendant's

forth

in the

defendant
finds

and

the

foregoing

and

statement

counsel, the

court

defendant's .conditional

voluntarily

made

and

it

conditional plea^-of guilty

is
to

so
the

charges set forth in the statement be accepted and entered.
DONE IN COURT this J ? /

day of

' / ^ ^ ^

\

JB-irs l^rJr^fc .Court .Judge

-9-
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THIRD CIRCUIT COURT - WVC
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CITY OF WEST VALLEY CITY
VS
STREETER, DENNIS L
3551 S 7200 W
WVC
UT

JUDGMENT, SENTENCE
(COMMITMENT)

8412 0

CASE NO: 901001586
DOB: 12/30/48
TAPE:
COUNT:
DATE: 04/30/92

THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT BEING ADJUDGED GUILTY FOR THE
OFFENSE(S) AS FOLLOWS:
Charge: 23-5-104 CRUELTY
Plea: Guilty
Fine:
1000.00
Jail: 60 DA

TO ANIMALS
Find: Guilty Plea
Susp:
1000.00
Susp: 60 DA

ACS:

Charge: 23-5-104 CRUELTY
Plea:
Fine:
0.00
Jail:
0

TO ANIMALS
Find: Dismissed
Susp:
0.00
Susp:
0

ACS:

Charge: 23-5-104 CRUELTY
Plea:
Fine:
0.00
Jail:
0

TO ANIMALS
Find: Dismissed
Susp:
0.00
Susp:
0

ACS:

Charge: 2 3-5-104 CRUELTY
Plea:
Fine:
0.00
Jail:
0

TO ANIMALS
Find: Dismissed
Susp:
0.00
Susp:
0

ACS:

Charge: 23-5-104 CRUELTY
Plea:
Fine:
0.00
Jail:
0

TO ANIMALS
Find: Dismissed
Slisp:
0.00
Susp:
0

ACS:

Charge: 23-5-104 CRUELTY
Plea:
Fine:
0.00
Jail:
0

TO ANIMALS
Find: Dismissed
Susp:
0.00
Susp:
0

ACS:

FEES AND ASSESSMENTS:
Fine Description: Fine- Prosecutor Spl
Credit:
0.00 Paid:

0.00

Due:

0.00

STREETER, DENNIS L

TRACKING:
Probation (Court)

CASE NO: 901001586

PAGE

02/28/93

DOCKET INFORMATION:
Sentence:
Defendant, Counsel and Prosecutor not present
Judge: THORNE, WILLIAM A.
Chrg: CRUELTY/ANIMALS
Plea: Guilty
Find Guilty Plea
Fine Amount:
1000.00
Suspended:
1000.00
Jail:
60 DAYS
Suspended: 60 DAYS
TERMS; 1. FINE AND JAIL TO BE SUSP IF DEF COMPLIES WITH TERMS 2
12 MONTHS PROBATION TO COURT NO OTHER VIOLATIONS 3. REVIEW LAW
AND GET INTOA COMPLIANCE 3. RESTRAINING ORDER TO BE LIFTED. 4.
DEF ENTERED CONDITIONAL PLEA ON CHARGE.

BY THE COURT

NOTE: APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 3 0 DAYS
OF ENTRY OF THIS JUDGMENT.

»c
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THIRD CIRCUIT COURT - WVC
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CITY OF WEST VALLEY CITY
VS
STREETER, DENNIS
3551 S 7200 W
'ATC

UT

JUDGMENT, SENTENCE
(COMMITMENT)

84120

CASE NO: 901001677
DOB:
/ /
TAPE:
COUNT:
DATE: 04/3 0/92

THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT BEING ADJUDGED GUILTY FOR THE
OFFENSE(S) AS FOLLOWS:
Charge: 17-1-102 DO BUSINESS W/O LIC
Plea: Guilty
Find: Guilty Plea
Fine:
1000.00
Susp:
1000.00
Jail: 60 DA
Susp: 60 DA

ACS:

Charge: 7-9-103 IMP USES FOR R-1-8 ZONE
Plea: Guilty
Find: Guilty Plea
Fine:
0.00
Susp:
0.00
Jail:
0
Susp:
0

ACS:

Charge: 7-9-103 IMP USES FOR R-1-8 ZONE
Plea:
Find: Dismissed
Fine:
0.00
Susp:
0.00
Jail:
0
Susp:
0

ACS:

Charge: 23-5-104 CRUELTY
Plea: Guilty
Fine:
0.00
Jail:
0

ACS:

TO ANIMALS
Find: Guilty Plea
Susp:
0.00
Susp:
0

Charge: 23-3-101 FAIL TO LIC DOG
Plea:
Find: Dismissed
Fine:
0.00
Susp:
0.00
Jail:
0
Susp:
0

ACS:

Charge: 23-3-101 FAIL TO LIC DOG
Plea:
Find: Dismissed
Fine:
0.00
Susp:
0.00
Jail:
0
Susp:
0

ACS:

Charge: 23-4-102 FAIL TO OBT RABIES VACC
Plea:
Find: Dismissed
Fine:
0.00
Susp:
0.00
Jail:
0
Susp:
0

ACS:

STREETER, DENNIS

CASE NO: 901001677

PAGE

Charge: 24-1-11 ACCUMULATIpN OF SOLID WASTE & LITTERING
Plea: Guilty
Find: Guilty Plea
Fine:
0 00
Susp:
0.00
Jail:
0
Susp:
0
ACS:
Charge: 7-2-119 IMP HEIGHT1 FOR FENCES
Plea:
Fjind: Dismissed
Fine:
0.00
Susp:
0.00
Jail:
0
Susp:
0
TRACKING:
Probation (Court)

ACS:

02/28/93

DOCKET INFORMATION:
Sentence:
Defendant, Counsel and Prosecutor not present
Judge: THORNE, WILLIAM A.
Chrg: DO BUSNS W/o LIC
Plea: GuiLty
Find Guilty Plea
1000.00
Fine Amount:
1000.00
Suspended:
Jail:
60 DAYS
Suspended: 60 DAYS
TERMS: 1. DEF TO BE ON PROB TO COURT WITH NO OTHER VIOLATION. 2.
FINE AND JAIL TO BE SUSPENDED UPON DEF COMPLYING WITH ALL TERMS,
3. RESTRAINING ORDER LIFTED. 4. DEF TO REVIEW LAW AND GET IN
COMPLAIANCE.
5. DEF ENTERED CONDITIONAL PLEA ON CNT 2, IMP USE FOR R-l-8 ZONE
~* <'

JUDGE, CIRCUIT COURT
NOTE: APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 3 0 DAXS'
OF ENTRY OF THIS JUDGMENT.
>
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CHAPTER 2
ANIMAL CONTROL OFFICIALS
SECTION 23-2-101.
SECTION 23-2-102.
SECTION 23-2-103.
SECTION 23-2-104.

DUTIES OF ANIMAL CONTROL OFFICIALS.
POWERS OF ANIMAL CONTROL OFFICIALS.
OFFICER'S AUTHORITY TO TAKE POSSESSION OF ANIMALS
- LIEN FOR CARE.
INTERFERENCE WITH OFFICER PROHIBITED.

SECTION 23-2-101.

DOTIES OF ANIMAL CONTROL OFFICIALS.

(1)

(2)

The Anirral Control Director shall:
(a)

Enforce this ordinance and perform other responsibilities
pursuant thereto.

(b)

Supervise tne municipal animal
jurisdiction.

(c)

Keep adequate records of all animals impounded and all moneys
collected.

(d)

See that all animals and animal holding facilities in nis
j u r i s d i c t i o n a r e licensed, controlled a n d permittee m
accordance v;itn any applicable, ordinance and/or regulations.

(e)

Establish, m cooperation with the Salt Lake City/County Healtn
Department and other interested governmental agencies, adequate
measures for rabies immunization and control.

shelter(s) under his

Eacn Animal Control Officer shall:
(a)

Enforce t m s Chapter in all respects pertaining to animal
control w i t n m the jurisdiction, including the care and
impounding of animals and prevention of cruelty to animals.

(b)

Carry out all duties prescribed or celegated by the director.

SECTION 23-2-102.

POWERS OF ANIMAL CCNTROL OFFICIALS.

(1) The Animal Control Director or any person employed by the Department
ct Animal Control as an Animal Control Officer snail take the oath of office
anc snail be vested witn the power and authority to enforce this ordinance.
(2) The Animal Control Director, his deputies, assistants and Animal
Control Officers are hereby authorized and empowered to apprehend and take
with them and impound any animal found in violation o f this ordinance
including, but not limited to unlicensed dogs.
(3) In the enforcement of this ordinance, any peace officer or the
Director of Animal Control or his assistants are authorized to enter onto the
open premises of any person to take possession of any dog in violation of this
ordinance.
23-5

SECTION 2 3 - 2 - 1 0 3 .

OFFICER'S AUTHORITY TO TAKE POSSESSION OF ANIMALS - LIEN
FOR CARE.

(1) Any law Enforcement (JDfficer may take possession of any animals being
treated cruelly and, after rea$onable. efforts to notify the owner, may provide
shelter and care for them or', upon permission from the owner, may destroy

them.
(2) Officers caring for animals pursuant to this section have a lien for
die reasonable value of the care and/or destruction. Any court, upon proofthat the owner has been notified of the lien and amount due at least 5 days
prior, shall order the animal sold at public auction or destroyed.
(3) Any Law Enforcement Officer may humanely destroy any animal found
suffering past recovery for any useful purpose. Before destroying the animal,
zfie officer shall obtain the judgment to the effect of a veterinarian, or of 2
reputable citizens called by him to vi^7 the animal in his presence, or shall
obtain consent to the destruction from the owner of the animal.
SECTION 23-2-104.

INESRFERENCE WITH OFFICER PROHIBITED.

It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly and intentionally
interfere with the director or any Animal Control Officer in the lawful
discharge of his duties as herein prescribed.

23-6

(3) Care and maintenance: It shall be the duty of any person to provide
any aniinal in his charge or custody, as owner or otherwise, with adequate
food, drink, care and shelter.
(4) Animals in vehicles: It shall be unlawful for any parson to carry
or confine any aniiral in or upon any vehicle in a cruel or inhumane manner,
including but not limited to, carrying or confining such animal without
adequate ventilation or for an unusual length of time.
(5) Abandonment of animals:
It shall be unlawful for any parson to
abandon any animal within the jurisdiction.
(6) Animal poisoning: Except as provided in Section 25 herein, it shall
be unlawful for any person by any mean^ to make accessible to any aniiral, with
intent to cause harm or death, any substance which has in any manner been
treated or prepared with any harmful or poisonous substance. This provision
shall not be interpreted so as to prohibit the use of poisonous substances for
the control of vermin in furtherance of the public health when applied in such
a manner as to reasonably prohibit access to other animals.
(7)

Injury to animals by motorists:
(a)

Every operator of a motor or other self-propelled vehicle upon
the streets of the jurisdiction shall iirrrediately upon
injuring, striking, maiming or running down any domestic animal
give such aid as can reasonably be rendered. In the absence of
the owner, he shall immediately notify the Office cf Animal
Control, furnishing facts relative to such injury.

(b)

It shall be the duty of such operator to rerain ar or near the
scene until such thve as the appropriate authorities arrive,
and upon the arrival of such authorities, the operator shall
immadiately identify himself to such authorities. Alternatively, in the absence of the owner, a person may give aid by
taking the aniiral to the Animal Control facility or other
appropriate facility and notifying the Office of Animal
Control.
Such animal may be taken in by the Animal Control
Facility and dealt with as deemed appropriate under the
circumstances.

(c)

Emergency vehicles are exempted from the requirements of this
provision.

(8) Animals for fighting:
(a)

It shall be unlawful for any person or corporation to raise,
keep or use any animal, fowl or bird for the purpose of
fighting or baiting; and for any person to be a perty to or be
present as a spectator, at any such fighting or baiting of any
aniiral or fowl; and for any person, firm or corporation to
knowingly rent any building, shed, rocm, yard, ground or
premises for any such purposes as aforesaid, or to knowingly

suffer or permit the use of his buildings, sheds, roans, yards,
grounds or premises for the purposes aforesaid.
(b) Law Enforcement Officers or Office of Animal Control officials
may enter any building or place where there is an exhibition of
the fighting or baiting of a live animal, or where preparations
are being made fqr such an exhibition, and the Law Enforcenent
Officers nay arrest persons there present and take possession
of all animals engaged in fighting, or there found for the
purposes of fighting, along with all implements or applications
used in such exhibition. This provision shall not be interpreted to authorize a search or arrest without a warrant when
such is required by law.
(9) Killing of birds: It shall be unlawful for any person to take or
kill any bird(s), or to rob or destroy any nest, egg or young of any bird in
violation of the laws of the State of Utah.
(10) Malicious impounding:
It shall be unlawful for any person malicioiisly to secret or impound the aniiral of anoth€or.
(11)

Keeping of diseased or painfully crippled animals:
(a)

It shall be unlawful for any person to abandon or turn out at
large any sick, diseased or disabled animal, but such animal
shall, when rendered worthless by reason of sickness of other
disability, be killed in a humane manner by the owner thereof
and disposed of as instructed after contacting the Office of
Animal Control.

(b)

It shall further be unlawful for the owner or person having the
charge, care, custody and control of such animal infected with
dangerous or incurable and/or painfully crippling condition to
have, keep or harbor such aniiral without placing the sams under
veterinary care or to dispose of the sane. The failure to take
such care is a violation of this ordinance and the Office of
Aniiral Control may take custody of such animals and deal with
then as deemed appropriate under the circumstances.

(12) It is a defense to the prosecution under this section that the
conduct of the actor towards the aniiral was by a licensed veterinarian using
accepted veterinary practice or directly related to a bona fide
experimentation for scientific research provided that if the aniiral is to be
destroyed, the manner enployed will not be unnecessarily cruel unless directly
necessary to the veterinary purpose or scientific research involved.
SECTION 23-5-105.

SBECZKKR AT ORGANIZED ANIMAL FIGHT.

(1) It is unlawful for any person to be a spectator at an organized
animal fight.
(2) For the purpose of this section only, an organized animal fight
ireans a fight between aniinals for the benefit of spectators. There is no
requirement that an admission fee be charged.
23-18
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with section 2156 of this title, as so amended, shall commence upon
the expiration of s^id ninety-day pence. In all other respects, e?jd
"~" end men is fhall bcoornc effective upon April 22, 1976.
(Pub.L. 39-544, § 24, Aug. 24, 1966, 80 Stat. 353; Pub.L. 94-279, § 15, Apr.
22, 1976, 90 Stat. 421.)

This report as well as any supporting documents, data, or findings
shall not be released to any other n^-^p^, r»r>p-Fcdera! agencies reorganizations unless and until it b?s been made public by an
appropriate committee of the Senate or the House of Representatives.

HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES

(Pub.L. 89-544, § 25, as added Pub.L. 91-579, § 22, Dec. 24, 1970, 84 Stat.
1565, and amended Pub.L. 94-279, § 16, Apr. 22, 1976, 90 Stat. 421.)

Revision Note* and Legislative Reports
1966 Act. Senate Report No. 1281,
Conference Report No. 1848, see 1966
U.S.Code Cong, and Adm.News, p. 2635.
fT
^
„ nA1
lt
1976 Act House Report No. 94-301,
House Conference Report No 94-976,
see 1976 U.S.Code Cong, and Adm.News,
P'
References In Text
The Animal Welfare Act Amendments
of 1976, referred to in text, is Pub.L.
94-279, Apr. 22, 1976, 90 Stat. 417,
which enacted section 2156 of this title,
amended sections 2131, 2132, 2134,
2136, 2139 to 2146, 2149, 2153 to 2155 of
this title, and section 3001 of Title 39,
Postal Service, repealed section 2150 of
this title, and enacted provisions set out
as notes under section 2131 of this title.
For complete classification of this Act to

the Code, see Short Title note set out
under section 2131 of this title and Tables volume.
.
,, v , N
, , .* c
0 .
Subsections (b), (c), and (d) of section
2143 of this title, referred to in text, were
r e d e , i g n a t e d s u b secs. (f), (g), and (h),
r e s p e c ( i v e i V f a n d n e w s u b s e c s . ( b ) f (c)>
and (d) of .section 2143 were enacted, by
Pub.L. 99-198. Title XVII, § 1752(a)(1),
(c), Dec. 23, 1985, 99 Slat. 1645, 1647.
Amendments
1976 Amendment. Pub.L. 94-279 added provisions setting particular effective
dates of compliance for intermediate
handlers and carriers and for dealers,
exhibitors, operators of auction sales,
and research facilities with respect to the
amendments made by the Animal Welfare Act Amendments of 1976.

WESTLAW ELECTRONIC RESEARCH

HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
Revision Notes and Legislative Reports
1970 Act. House Report No. 91-1651,
see 1970 U.S.Code Cong, and Adm.News,
p 51 3,
' °
1976 Act. House Report No. 94-801,
Hotise Conference Report No. 94-976,
see 1976 U.S.Code Cong, and Adm.News,
p. 758.

Amendments
1976 Amendment. Par. (4). Pub.L.
94-279 added par. (4).
Effective Dates
1970 Act. Section effective one >ear
after Dec. 74, 1970, see section 23 of
Pub.L. 91-579, set out as a note under
section 2131 of this title.

LIBRARY REFERENCES
American Digest System
Cruelty to animals, see Animals <$=>38 to 40.
Encyclopedias
Cruelty to animals, see CJ.S. Animals § 99 et seq.

WESTLAW ELECTRONIC RESEARCH
See WESTLAW Electronic Research Guide following the Explanation.

See WESTLAW Electronic Research Guide following the Explanation.

§ 2156.
§ 2 1 5 5 * Annual report to the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives
Not later than March of each year, the Secretary shall submit to
the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives a comprehensive and detailed written report with
respect to—
(1) the identification of all research facilities, exhibitors, and
other persons and establishments licensed by the Secretary
under section 2133 and section 2142 of this title;
(2) the nature and place of all investigations and inspections
conducted by the Secretary under section 2146 of this title, and
all reports received by the Secretary under section 2143 of this
title;
(3) recommendations for legislation to improve the administration of this chapter or any provisions thereof; and
(4) recommendations and conclusions concerning the aircraft environment as it relates to the carriage of live animals in
air transportation.

Animal fighting venture prohibition

(a) Sponsoring or exhibiting animal In any fighting venture

It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly sponsor or
exhibit an animal in any animal fighting venture to which any
animal was moved in interstate or foreign commerce.
(b) Buying, selling, delivering, or transporting animals for participation In
animal fighting venture

It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly sell, buy,
transport, or deliver to another person or receive from another
person for purposes of transportation, in interstate or foreign commerce, any dog or other animal for purposes of having the dog or
other animal participate in an animal fighting venture.
(c) Use of Postal Service or other Interstate instrumentality for promoting
or furthering animal fighting venture

It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly use the mail
service of the United States Tostal Service or any interstate instru-
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thering an animal fighting venture except as performed outside the
limits of the States of the United States.

in a separate civil action brought in the jurisdiction in which the
owner is found, resides, or transacts business.

(d) Violation of State law

(g) Definitions

Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of
this section, the activities prohibited by such subsections shall be
unlawful with respect to fighting ventures involving live birds only
if the fight is to take place in a State where it would be in violation
of the laws thereof.
(e) Penalties

Any person who violates subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section
shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned for not more
than 1 year, or both, for each such violation.
(f) Investigation of violations by Secretary; assistance by other federal
agencies; issuance of search warrant; forfeiture; costs recoverable
In forfeiture or civil action

The Secretary or any other person authorized by him shall make
such investigations as the Secretary deems necessary to determine'
whether any person has violated or is violating any provision of this
section, and the Secretary may obtain the assistance of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, the Department of the Treasury, or other
law enforcement agencies of the United States, and State and local
governmental agencies, in the conduct of such investigations, under
cooperative agreements with such agencies. A warrant to search
for and seize any animal which there is probable cause to believe
was involved in any violation 6f this section may be issued by any
judge of the United States or of a State court of record or by a
United States magistrate within the district wherein the animal
sought is located. Any United States marshal or any person authorized under this section to conduct investigations may apply for and
execute any such warrant, and any animal seized under such a
warrant shall be held by the United States marshal or other authorized person pending disposition thereof by the court in accordance
with this subsection. Necessary care including veterinary treatment shall be provided while the animals are so held in custody.
Any animal involved in any violation of this section shall be liable
to be proceeded against and forfeited to the United States at any
time on complaint filed in any United States district court or other
court of the United States for any jurisdiction in which the animal
is found and upon a judgment ol forfeiture shall bo disposed of by
—i- r~_ i*,*,f,,i ™it-v^c*c tM* ki/ ntUov humane means, as the court

For purposes of this section—
(1) the term "animal fighting venture" means any event
which involves a fight between at least two animals and is
conducted for purposes of sport, wagering, or entertainment
except that the term "animal fighting venture" shall not be
deemed to include any activity the primary purpose of which
involves the use of one or more animals in hunting another
animal or animals, such as waterfowl, bird, raccoon, or fox
hunting;
(2) the term "interstate or foreign commerce" means—
(A) any movement between any place in a State to any
place in another State or between places in the same State
through another State; or
(B) any movement from a foreign country into any State;
(3) the term "interstate instrumentality" means telegraph,
telephone, radio, or television operating in interstate or foreign
commerce;
(4) the term "State" means any State of the United States, the
District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and
any territory or possession of the United States;
(5) the term "animal" means any live bird, or any live dog or
other mammal, except man; and
(6) the conduct by any person of any activity prohibited by
this section shall not render such person subject to the other
sections of this chapter as a dealer, exhibitor, or otherwise.
(h) Conflict with State law

The provisions of this chapter shall not supersede or otherwise
invalidate any such State, local, or municipal legislation or ordinance relating to animal fighting ventures except in case of a direct
and irreconcilable conflict between any requirements thereunder
and this chapter or any rule, regulation, or standard hereunder.
(Pub.L. 89-544, § 26(a)-(h)(l), as added Pub.L. 94-279, § 17, Apr. 22, 1976,
90 Stat. 421.)
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
Revision No tea and Legislative Reports

Codification*
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by ' Pub.L. 94-279, amended section
3001(a) of Title 39, Postal Service.

LIBRARY REFERENCES
American Digest System
Cruelty to animals, see Animals <s=>38 to 40.
Encyclopedias
Cruelty to animals, see C.J.S. Animals § 99 ct scq.

WESTLAW ELECTRONIC RESEARCH
See WESTLAW Electronic Research Guide following the Explanation.

§ 2157.

Release of trade secrets

(a) Release of confidential information prohibited

It shall be unlawful for any member of an Institutional Animal
Committee to release any confidential information of the research
facility including any information that concerns or relates to—
(1) the trade secrets, processes, operations, style of work, or
apparatus; or
(2) the identity, confidential statistical data, amount or
source of any income, profits, losses, or expenditures,
of the research facility.
(b) Wrongful use of confidential Information prohibited

It shall be unlawful for any member of such Committee—
(1) to use or attempt to use to his advantages; or
(2) to reveal tc any other person,
any information which is entitled to protection as confidential
information under subsection (a) of this section.
(c) Penalties

A violation of subsection (a) or (b) of this section is punishable
by—
(!) removal from such Committee; and
(2)(A) a fine of not more than $1,000 and imprisonment of
not more than one year; or
(B) if such violation is willful, a fine of not more than
$10,000 and imprisonment of not more than three years.
(d) Recovery of damages by injured person; costs; attorney's fee

Any person, including any research facility, injured in its business
or property by reason of a violation of this section may recover all
actual and consequential damages sustained by such person and the
cost of the suit including a reasonable attorney's fee.

Ch. 54
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(e) Other rights and remedies

Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect any other
rights of a person injured in its business or property by reason of a
violation of this section. Subsection (d) of this section shall not be
construed to limit the exercise of any such rights arising out of or*
relating to a violation of subsections (a) and (b) of this section.
(Pub.L. 89-544, § 27, as added Pub.L. 99-198, Title XVII, § 1754, Dec. 23,
1985, 99 Stat. 1649.)

HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
Revision Notes and Legislative Reports
1985 Act. House Report Nos. 99271(1), 99-271(11), Senate Report No. 99145, House Conference Report No. 99447, and Statements by Legislative leaders, sec 1985 U.S.Code Cong, and Adm.
News, p. 1103.

Effective Dates
1985 Act. Section effective one year
afler Dec. 23, 1985, see section 1759 of
pUD.L. 99-198, set'out as a note under
section 2 m of this th,^

LIBRARY REFERENCES
American Digest System
Cruelty to animals, see Animals «3=>38 to 40.
Encyclopedias
Cruelty to animals, see C.J.S. Animals § 99 et seq.

WESTLAW ELECTRONIC RESEARCH
See WESTLAW Electronic Research Guide following the Explanation.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
P.L. 94-279
of the act, as amended, which relate.to them to commence 90 days
after promulgation of regulations under section 13 of the act, as
amended, which shall be not later than 9 months after enactment;
(2) to require compliance by dealers, exhibitors, operators of auction
sales, and research facilities with other provisions ox the act, as
amended, and the implementing regulations 90 days after enactment; and to require compliance by all persons with the veterinary
certificate, young animal, and C.O.D. amendments to section 13 of
the act S)0% days after enactment. All other amendments, principally section 26 (animal fighting ventures), would become effective
upon the date of enactment.
[page 22]

Conference substitute
The Conference substitute adopts the House provision with an
amendment which makes new section 26 of the act (animal fighting
ventures) effective 90 days after enactment of these amendmenfs.
28. ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS (SECTION 23 OF EXISTING LAW)

Senate bill
The Senate bill amends section 25 of the act to require the
Secretary of Agriculture to include in his annual report to the Congress recommendations and conclusions concerning flight safety, including the aircraft, its environment, or equipment as they relate to
the carriage of live animals in air transportation, but only those recommendations and conclusions which have been approved by the
Secretary of Transportation, tlte Administrator of the FAA, and the
Chairman of the CAB.
House amendment
The House amendment would amend section 25 of the act to require the Secretary to include in his annual report to the Congress
recommendations and conclusions concerning the aircraft environment
as it relates to the carriage of live animals in air transportation.
Conference substitute
The Conference substitute adopts the House provision.
29. ANIMAL FIGHTING (NEW SECTION

26)

Senate bill
The iSenate bill contains no provisions relating to animal fighting
ventures.
House .amendment
The House amendment adds to the act a new section 26 which
would subject to a fine of not more than $5,000 or imprisonment for
not more than 1 year, or both, any person who knowingly (a)
sponsors or exhibits an animal in any fighting venture to which any
animal was moved in interstate or foreign commerce, (b) sells, buys,
transports, or delivers to another person or receives from another
person for purposes of transportation in interstate or foreign commerce any dog or other animal for purposes of having the dog or other
animal participate in an animal fighting venture, or (c) uses the U.S.
mails or any interstate instrumentality for purposes of promoting or
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furthering an animal fighting venture held within the United States.
The Secretary of Agriculture would be authorized to make such investigations as he deems necessary and to enlist the assistance of the
FBI, Treasury, or other Federal, State or local law enforcement
agencies. The provisions of this new section would not supersede or
otherwise invalidate any State, local, or municipal legislation or
ordinance relating to animal fighting ventures except in case of a
direct ahd irreconcilable conflict. For purposes of this new section of
the act,, the term "animal" would be defined to mean any live bird,
or any l&ve dog or other mammal, except man.
[page 23]

Conference substitute
The Conference substitute adopts the House provision with an
amendment which provides that the activities prohibited by subsections (a,), (b), or (c) of new section 26 of the act shall be unlawful
with respect to fighting ventures involving live birds only if the fight
is to tajie place in a State where it would be in violation of the laws
thereof,|!The section does not apply to export of live birds to foreign
countries nor to interstate shipment of live birds for breeding purposes. Game fowl publications would be unaffected except that advertising of fights involving live birds would be prohibited except in those
instances wrhere such fights are to be held in a State or territory where
they are not unlawful.
THOMAS S. FOLEY,
W. R. POAGE,
BOB BERGLAND,
JERRY LITTON,
JAMES WEAVER,
TOM HARKIN,

Managers on the Part of the House.
WARREN G. MAGNUSON,
WENDELL H. FORD,
LOWELL P. WEICKER, Jr.,

Managers on the Part of the Senate.
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Art. XI, § 5

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

Sec. 5. {Municipal corporations — To be created by general law — Right and manner of adopting charter
| for own government — Powers included.]
Corporations for municipal purposes shall not be created by special laws.
The legislature by general laws shall provide for the incorporation, organization and classification of cities and towns in proportion to population, which
laws may be altered, amended or repealed. Any incorporated city or town may
frame and adopt a charter for its own government in the following manner:
The legislative authority of the city may, by two-thirds vote of its members,
and upon petition of qualified electors to the number of fifteen per cent of all
votes cast at the next preceding election for the office of the mayor, shall
forthwith provide by ordinance for the submission to the electors of the question: "Shall a commission be chosen to frame a charter?" The ordinance shall
require that the question be submitted to the electors at the next regular
municipal election. The ballot containing such question shall also contain the
names of candidates for members of the proposed commission, but without
party designation. Such candidates shall be nominated in the same manner as
required by law for nomination of city officers. If a majority of the electors
voting on the question of choosing a commission shall vote in the affirmative,
then the fifteen candidates receiving a majority of the votes cast at such
election, shall constitute the charter commission, and shall proceed to frame a
charter.
Any charter so framed shall be submitted to the qualified electors of the city
at an election to be held at a time to be determined by the charter commission,
which shall be not less than sixty days subsequent to its completion and
distribution among the electors and not more than one year from such date.
Alternative provisions may also be submitted to be voted upon separately.
The commission shall make provisions for the distribution of copies of the
proposed charter and of any alternative provisions to the qualified electors of
the city, not less than sixty days before the election at which it is voted upon.
Such proposed charter and such alternative provisions as are approved by a
majority of the electors voting thereon, shall become an organic law of such
city at such time as may be fixed therein, and shall supersede any existing
charter and all laws affecting the organization and government of such city
which are now in conflict therewith. Within thirty days after its approval a
copy of such charter as adopted, certified by the mayor and city recorder and
authenticated by the seal of such city, shall be made in duplicate and deposited, one in the office of the secretary of State and the other in the office of the
city recorder, and thereafter all courts shall take judicial notice of such charter.
Amendments to any such charter may be framed and submitted by a charter commission in the same manner as provided for making of charters, cr
may be proposed by the legislative authority of the city upon a two-thirds vote
thereof, or by petition of qualified electors to a number equal to fifteen per
cent of the total votes cast for mayor on the next preceding election, and any
such amendment may be submitted at the next regular municipal election,
and having been approved by the majority of the electors voting thereon, shall
become part of the charter at the time fixed in such amendment and shall be
certified and filed as provided in case of charters.
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Each city forming its charter under this section shall have, and is hereby
granted, the authority to exercise all powers relating to municipal affairs, and
to adopt and enforce within its limits, local police, sanitary and similar regulations not in conflict with the general law, and no enumeration of powers in
this constitutiqn or any law shall be deemed to limit or restrict the general
grant of authority hereby conferred; but this grant of authority shall not
include the power to regulate public utilities, not municipally owned, if any
such regulation of pubUc utilities is provided for by general law, nor be
deemed to limit or restrict the power of the legislature in matters relating to
State affairs, t6 enact general laws applicable alike to all cities of the State.
The power to be conferred upon the cities by this section shall include the
following:
(a) To l£vy, assess and collect taxes and borrow money, within the
limits prescribed by general law, and to levy and collect special assessments for benefits conferred.
(b) To furnish all local public services, to purchase, hire, construct,
own, maintain and operate, or lease, public utilities local in extent and
use; to acquire by condemnation, or otherwise, within or without the
corporate limits, property necessary for any such purposes, subject to
restrictions imposed by general law for the protection of other communities; and to grant local public utility franchises and within its powers
regulate the exercise thereof.
(c) To make local public improvements and to acquire by condemnation, or otherwise, property within its corporate limits necessary for such
improvements; and also to acquire an excess over than [that] needed for
any such improvement and to sell or lease such excess property with
restrictions, in order to protect and preserve the improvement.
(d) To issue and sell bonds on the security of any such excess property,
or of any public utility owned by the city, or of the revenues thereof, or
both, including, in the case of public utility, a franchise stating the terms
upon which, in case of foreclosure, the-purchaser may operate such utility.
History: Const. 1896.
Compiler's Notes. — The bracketed word
"that" in Subsection (c) of the last paragraph
appeared in this section as published in the
Revised Statutes of 1933.
Cross-References. — Incorporation of cities
and towns, § 10-2-101 et seq.

Local improvements, § 10-7-20.
Miscellaneous powers of cities and towns,
§ 10-1-202.
Municipal Code, home rule exceptions to,
§§ 10-1-106, 10-3-818.
Powers and duties of all cities, § 10-8-1 et
seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Classification of cities.
Debt limit.
Improvement districts.
Initiated ordinance.
Legislative power.
Mass transportation system.
Municipal power.
Ordinance licensing nonprofit clubs.
Police power,
Power versus right to operate public utility.

Repeal of council-manager charter of city.
Sewage disposal.
Water conservancy districts.
Withholding tax provision.
Cited.
Classification of cities.
The power of the legislature to classify cities
according to population is expressly conferred
by this section, and statute passed to enable
cities of first class to meet needs and requirements of larger municipalities was general, in
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